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ABSTRACT 
Researchers have proposed a vulnerabilities model that attempts to explain the 
similarities between the internalizing disorders via a hierarchical pathway of trait affectivity and 
cognitive factors among adults.  The current study aimed to replicate and extend this model to 
symptoms of four internalizing disorders among youth: obsessions and compulsions, generalized 
anxiety/worry, social anxiety, and depression.  Regression-based path analyses utilized data from 
a community sample of 105 youth aged 12-17 (67.6% female, 80% white, non-Hispanic).  
Results largely replicated prior models in the adult literature and overall supported a hierarchical 
paradigm.  Trait negative affect and avoidant behavior predicted mid-tier cognitive 
vulnerabilities (anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty, and thought suppression).  Results 
were more mixed when predicting specific sets of internalizing symptoms with intolerance of 
uncertainty having the greatest impact on obsessive-compulsive and generalized anxiety 
symptoms.  Specific pathways are discussed in terms of prior research and theory.  The 
hypothesized model was compared to a fully identified version. While statistically significant, 
the difference in variance explained was not practically meaningful, indicating parsimony and 
theory driven relationships.  Limitations and future directions based on this preliminary work are 
discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Internalizing disorders are among the most common psychological diagnoses in children 
and adolescents (Costello et al., 1996; Kessler & Walters, 1998; Lewinsohn, Gotlib, Lewinsohn, 
Seeley, & Allen, 1998; Lewinsohn, Hops, Roberts, Seeley, & Andrews, 1993; Merikangas et al., 
2010).  The internalizing disorders are those in which the primary cause of impairment is 
emotional in nature (i.e., anxiety or depression) as opposed to behavioral (i.e., hyperactivity, 
oppositional behavior, delinquency, etc.).  According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), the anxiety 
disorders include separation anxiety disorder, selective mutism, specific phobia, social anxiety 
disorder (formerly social phobia), panic disorder, agoraphobia, generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD), substance/medication-induced anxiety disorder, and other- or un-specified anxiety 
disorders.  In the 5th edition of the DSM, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) was separated 
from the anxiety disorders and categorized within obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders, 
though OCD is conceptualized as an anxiety disorder in the majority of the literature to date, 
based on the previous DSM edition.  Internalizing mood disorders are major depressive disorder 
(MDD), persistent depressive disorder (formerly dysthymic disorder), the bipolar disorders, 
cyclothymic disorder, and other- or un-specified mood disorders.  Typically, only MDD and 
persistent depressive disorder are the subject of internalizing research, due to conceptual overlap 
with externalizing features (i.e., mania) in the bipolar and cyclothymic disorders.   
Cognitive-behavioral theories generally conceptualize the internalizing disorders as 
consisting of three symptom domains: physiology, behavior, and cognition.  Lang (1979) 
described fear as consisting of familiar patterns of information processing including 
physiological arousal (i.e., activation of the autonomic nervous system), cognitive processing 
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(i.e., formation and activation of unrealistic beliefs and/or expectations), and behavioral 
prototypes (i.e., familiar patterns of behavioral responses to feared stimuli).  Likewise, 
depressive disorders have been conceptualized as consisting of the same three general domains, 
with a primary emphasis on cognitive (e.g., distorted beliefs/schemas) and behavioral processes 
(e.g., withdrawal, inhibition; Beck, 1976).  
Epidemiological and clinical research has often noted high rates of comorbidity among 
anxiety and depression in children and adolescents (Brady & Kendall, 1992; Brown, Campbell, 
Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001; Strauss, Last, Hersen, & Kazden, 1988; Woolston et al., 
1989).  Similarly, clinical and psychometric investigations have found moderate-to-strong 
correlations between anxiety and depressive symptomatology measures, often leading to poor 
differentiation between the two constructs (for a review, see Clark & Watson, 1991).  It has been 
suggested that such high rates of comorbity and correlations among internalizing syndromes 
suggests underlying etiological, process, and/or symptom commonalities (Barlow, 2002; 
Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Clark, 2005; Clark & Watson, 1991; Mennin, Heimberg, Fresco, & 
Ritter, 2008; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998). 
Models of adult psychopathology help to explain symptom overlap and high rates of 
comorbidity among the internalizing disorders.  However, such models for children and 
adolescents have not been widely studied.  Therefore, this study proposes to examine a 
hierarchical model of common factors of symptoms of four internalizing disorders: OCD, GAD, 
social anxiety disorder, and major depressive- and/or persistent depressive disorder.  The 
proposed model is based upon the adult literature and includes aspects of several factors that 
contribute to adult psychopathology: trait affectivity, behavioral temperament, and cognitive 
traits.  The proceeding literature review introduces the various theoretical and empirical bases for 
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such a model.  The review begins by highlighting three theories that explain the often-noted 
similarities and comorbidities between the internalizing disorders: the Tripartite Model, the 
Integrative Hierarchical Model, and the Triple Vulnerabilities Model.  Next, a behavioral trait 
(i.e., behavioral inhibition) and three specific cognitive traits, thought to be vulnerabilities for 
internalizing disorders, are presented (i.e., anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty, and 
thought suppression).  Following this, regression and structural models of adult internalizing 
symptomatology are presented.  These structural models synthesize elements of the general and 
cognitive vulnerability theories and present an empirical heuristic for examining hierarchical trait 
and cognitive factors within the internalizing disorders.  Finally, a rationale for the current study 
and a hypothesized path model is proposed that replicates and extends the adult literature to 
youth. 
 
1.1 Tripartite Model of Internalizing Symptomatology  
 After noting symptom similarities and high rates of comorbidity between anxiety and 
depression, Clark and Watson (1991) outlined a hierarchical model to explain these relationships.  
Their three-factor model resembles a triangle with a general vulnerability factor on the top, 
leading to a second level consisting of two differentiating factors specific to either anxiety or 
depression.  At the top of the model, an emotional factor (i.e., general distress) is common to 
both anxiety and depression.  According to the model, the general distress factor is 
operationalized as a trait propensity to experience negative affective states (i.e., guilt, anger, 
sadness, fear, etc.).  Following the general predictor, anxiety and depression are differentiated by 
the presence (or absence) of two other factors: physiological hyperarousal and propensity for 
positive affect (e.g., joy, pride, enthusiasm, alertness, etc.).  An important distinction between the 
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Tripartite Model and other models of developmental psychopathology is that Clark and Watson 
did not specifically conceptualize negative affectivity, physiological hyperarousal, and positive 
affectivity as developmental psychopathology vulnerabilities, rather they viewed them as 
common and differentiating facets of internalizing emotional experiences.  In contrast, others 
have discussed these factors as vulnerabilities in other models (i.e., predisposing traits, which 
can exist in the absence of an internalizing disorder). 
 
1.1.1 Negative Affectivity 
Negative affectivity is generally conceptualized as a trait, rather than state phenomenon 
(Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994); that is negative affectivity is the propensity to experience 
pervasive negative emotional states.  Studies have demonstrated negative affectivity remains 
relatively stable over time (Brown, 2007; Lambert, McCreary, Joiner, Schmidt, & Ialongo, 2004; 
Lonigan, Phillips, & Hooe, 2003).  Likewise, negative affectivity is considered analogous with 
Eysenck’s (1967) neuroticism personality dimension (Clark et al., 1994).  Over the years since 
the Tripartite Model was proposed, several studies that jointly factor analyzed measures of 
anxiety and depression in children and adults have supported the existence of a higher-order 
factor (Joiner Catanzaro, & Laurent, 1996; Lambert et al., 2004; Prenoveau et al., 2010; Spence, 
1997; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996).  
Predictive relationships have been routinely noted between negative 
affectivity/neuroticism and specific internalizing disorders, though results vary by methodology.  
Negative affectivity/neuroticism contributed significantly to social phobia symptomatology in 
adults in several studies (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Kotov, Watson, Robles, & Schmidt, 
2007; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Trull & Sher, 1994); however, a study among children (Chorpita, 
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Plummer, & Moffitt, 2000) did not find such a relationship.  Negative affectivity has also been 
shown to contribute to OCD symptoms in adults (Brown et al., 1998; Kotov et al., 2007; Norton 
& Mehta, 2007; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003) and children (Chorpita et al., 2000).  
However, a path model failed to replicate these relationships to OCD in a clinical sample of 
adults (Norton, Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 2005).  
Researchers have also found that negative affectivity predicts GAD and depression 
symptoms; among adults, moderate-to-strong predictions of GAD symptoms have been noted 
(Brown et al., 1998; Kotov et al., 2007; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton et al., 2005; Sexton et al., 
2003).  However, among children, only a weak relationship has been found with worry, a 
common analog for GAD symptoms (Chorpita et al., 2000).  Links between negative 
affectivity/neuroticism and depression have also been noted among adults, though the strength of 
the relationship varies (Brown et al., 1998; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton et al., 2005; Trull & 
Sher, 1994; Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988).  Depressive symptoms in children and adolescents 
likewise have variable relationships with negative affectivity; some studies have shown 
moderate-to-strong predictions of depressive symptoms (Anthony, Lonigan, Hooe, & Phillips, 
2002; Jacques & Mash, 2004; Lonigan et al., 2003), while another did not find a relationship 
(Chorpita et al., 2000).  Collectively, these studies suggest negative affectivity plays a role in 
social phobia, GAD, OCD, and depression symptoms in adults, but that these relationships are 
possibly less stable or less well researched in children and adolescents.   
 
1.1.2 Positive Affectivity 
 One of the defining features of MDD and persistent depressive disorder is a significant 
loss of pleasure in daily activities or interests (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  It is not 
 ! 6!
surprising then that low positive affectivity was proposed as a specific component of depression 
according to the Tripartite Model (Clark & Watson, 1991).  Positive affectivity is also seen as 
analogous to Eysenck’s (1967) extroversion personality dimension (Clark et al., 1994).  Lack of 
positive affectivity is often conceptualized as anhedonia; therefore, the absence of positive 
affectivity is theorized to differentiate depression from anxiety.  Consistent with the Tripartite 
Model, positive affectivity/extroversion has routinely been shown to negatively predict 
depressive symptoms among adults (Brown et al., 1998; Norton et al., 2005; Trull & Sher, 1994; 
van der Heiden et al., 2010; Watson et al., 1988).  Similar relationships have been noted with 
children’s depression symptoms (Anthony et al., 2002; Chorpita et al., 2000; Hughes & Kendall, 
2009; Jacques & Mash, 2004; Lonigan et al., 2003).  
 It has also been suggested that social phobia is characterized by low positive 
affectivity/extroversion due to associations with introverted and/or inhibited temperament (Clark 
et al., 1994); regression and structural equation models have supported this hypothesis in adults 
(Brown et al., 1998; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Trull & Sher, 1994; Watson et al., 1988; Watson, 
Gamez, & Simms, 2005).  Similarly, researchers have found positive affectivity predicts social 
anxiety in children and adolescents (Chorpita et al., 2000; Hughes & Kendall, 2009).  Therefore, 
studies of positive affectivity suggest associations with both depressive and social phobia 
symptoms in adults and children.  
 
1.1.3 Physiological Hyperarousal  
Physiological hyperarousal was originally modeled as a second-tier in the Tripartite 
Model; however, some studies have cast doubt on this configuration.  Among a clinical sample 
of children and adolescents, Joiner et al. (1996) found a nonhierarchical, three-factor model had 
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the best fit.  Similarly, another single-level model in children and adolescents had good structural 
fit with three-factors that approximated the components of the Tripartite Model (Chorpita, 
Albano, & Barlow, 1998).  Evidence has also cast doubt on the proposal that physiological 
hyperarousal applies broadly to all anxiety domains.  Among adults and children, studies have 
noted an adequate fit when hyperarousal is indicated only by specific anxiety symptoms, 
primarily the fear-based disorders (e.g., phobias, separation anxiety, panic, etc.; Brown et al, 
1998; Chorpita et al., 1998; Chorpita et al., 2000; Joiner et al., 1996). 
 
1.2 Integrative Hierarchical Model of Anxiety and Depression 
The Integrative Hierarchical Model of Anxiety and Depression (IHM; Mineka et al., 
1998) was born out of the Tripartite Model and the previously noted lack of support for the 
uniform relation of physiological hyperarousal to all anxiety domains.  Within the IHM, the 
hierarchical nature of the Tripartite Model was maintained, however, the content of each level 
was revised.  As its name suggests, the IHM integrated the general distress factor of Tripartite 
Model with the hypothesis that the various internalizing domains are closely related but 
ultimately distinct (see Brown et al., 1998; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996).  Overall, the IHM does not 
propose specific lower level factors, rather it suggests a basic structure where a multitude of 
symptoms or emotions are co-related among the internalizing disorders.  Like the Tripartite 
Model, the IHM was not specifically proposed as a model of developmental psychopathology; 
rather, it described the structural similarities and differences between internalizing symptoms 
themselves. 
The IHM is structured in at least two levels of common factors (though more are possible 
in the model). The first level is a general factor common to all internalizing disorders, and 
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largely remains operationalized by negative affectivity.  While, Mineka and colleagues argued 
the general factor relates to all internalizing disorders, they suggested that it might do so with 
varying degrees of influence.  The second level of the model consists of more specific factors 
that are unique to certain disorders, thus helping to differentiate them.  While these 
differentiating traits were originally discussed as secondary factors, the model did not specify 
outright the number and structure of these traits (i.e., several, more narrowly defined lower-
levels are possible).  The unique combination of general and specific factors is then theorized to 
differentiate between the internalizing disorders.  In their proposal, Mineka and colleagues 
(1998) integrated theoretical and more basic literature by proposing examples of potential 
secondary factors such as Beck’s Content-Specificity Hypothesis (i.e., anxiety is associated with 
future-based worries, whereas depression is associated with ruminative cognitions of the past; 
1976) and information processing such as memory and attentional biases.  However, these 
factors are not considered inherent to the model, rather they represent examples of factors that fit 
the notion of discriminating secondary traits.   
An example of a model using the IHM structure is a study by Prenoveau and colleagues 
(2010).  The authors performed a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using items from 
several measures of anxiety and depression in late adolescents.  The best-fitting model was a 
three level structure, in which five specific anxiety symptom domains were indicated.  
Additionally, two mid-level latent factors – “anxious-misery” and “fears” – were supported; 
anxious-misery was indicated by items relating to positive affectivity (negative loading), 
depression, and social anxiety.  The factor, termed “fears,” was indicated by items relating to 
specific phobias, social anxiety, and panic symptoms.  Lastly, a higher-order factor, termed 
“general distress” was indicated by all items.  This factor analytic approach described a model in 
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which a general factor is common to all internalizing psychopathology and two mid-level factors 
relate largely to underlying emotional similarities between the items (e.g., anxious-misery 
indicated depressive and introverted/low positive affect symptoms).  Overall, the IHM was an 
improved upon the Tripartite Model in its ability to explain correlations and comorbidities of 
internalizing psychopathology by allowing for several convergent and divergent factors.  While 
the IHM provides a general heuristic with which to conceptualize the internalizing disorders, the 
model does not describe etiological similarities per se. 
 
1.3 Triple Vulnerabilities Model of Anxiety 
One of the best-known comprehensive models of developmental psychopathology for the 
internalizing disorders is the Triple Vulnerabilities Model, which proposes a diathesis of 
biological, psychological, and environmental factors.  Evidence from family and twin studies 
points to a heritable component of anxiety and depression, suggesting a common biological 
etiology (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1992a; 1992b; Last, Hersen, Kazdin, Francis, 
& Grubb, 1987; Murray & Sines, 1996; Turner, Beidel, & Costello, 1987).  Barlow (2002) and 
Chorpita and Barlow (1998) integrated biological evidence with Clark and Watson’s conception 
of trait affectivity when they proposed the first vulnerability: a genetic or biological risk factor, 
which can include personality (i.e., neuroticism), propensity for negative affectivity, or 
behavioral inhibition/propensity for autonomic arousal.  The second vulnerability is a trait 
psychological/cognitive factor, which interacts with biological traits.  This second vulnerability 
is similar to Bandura’s (1988) self-efficacy theory and includes a propensity to believe in the 
uncontrollability or unpredictability of experiences, as well as an internal attributional style (i.e., 
personal responsibility for control is attributed to the self rather than externally).  It has been 
 !10!
suggested that early environmental experience and biological vulnerabilities contribute to the 
development of a schema consisting of beliefs in decreased personal control and increased 
personal responsibility (Barlow, 2002; Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Chorpita, Brown, & Barlow, 
1998).  The combination of the biological and psychological/cognitive vulnerabilities is thought 
to result in a general proclivity for anxiety that is narrowed in focus toward specific domains 
(i.e., the categorical anxiety disorders) via interaction with negative environmental experiences.  
Environmental experiences operate through social learning and conditioning such as behavioral 
modeling and negative verbal information transmission.  The domains of social learning then 
determine the focus of the anxiety; for example, aversive social interactions may result in social 
phobia in persons with the biological and psychological predispositions.   
The primary difference between the IHM and the Triple Vulnerabilities Model is the 
focus on common etiology rather than overlapping symptomatology.  Where the IHM suggests a 
higher-order affective symptom experience, the Triple Vulnerabilities Model suggests an 
underlying biological etiology common to anxiety and depression.  Negative 
affectivity/neuroticism is theorized as one such biological factor due to having relationships with 
the internalizing disorders, as well as being heritable traits (Baker, Cesa, Gatz, & Mellins, 1992; 
Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemman, & Livesley, 1998; Lake, Eaves, Maes, Heath, & Martin, 
2000; Neiss et al., 2005).  Barlow (2002) also proposed that the behaviorally inhibited 
temperament represents another biological vulnerability in the Triple Vulnerabilities Model due 
to its grounding in neurobehavioral theory.  
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1.3.1 Behavioral Inhibition and Approach Systems  
Gray (1970; 1982) proposed a neurobehavioral heuristic of personality, in which 
activation of differing limbic pathways of motivation is thought to produce trait behavioral 
responding.  The first pathway is the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which is activated by 
aversive stimuli (i.e., punishment or uncertainty/novelty) and serves to redirect attentional 
resources toward the stimulus by inhibiting ongoing behaviors and increasing arousal (e.g., 
freezing, autonomic activation).  In contrast, the behavioral approach system (BAS) is primarily 
thought to respond to pleasurable or rewarding outcomes by increasing behavioral responses 
(e.g., approach, impulsivity, avoidance).  According to the theory, the BIS and BAS function 
relatively independently of one another, a notion that has been empirically supported by weak or 
no correlations between the constructs (Campbell-Sills, Liverant, & Brown, 2004; Coplan, 
Wilson, Frohlick, & Zelenski, 2006; Johnson, Turner, Iwata, 2003; Jorm et al., 1999; Vervoort et 
al., 2010).  In Gray’s view, the BIS and BAS underlie the various categories of personality or 
temperament styles and relate to anxiety and impulsivity. 
 Hirshfeld et al. (1992) demonstrated that children with stable inhibited behavior were 
more likely to have an anxiety disorder four-to-five years later compared to children whose 
inhibited behavior was not a stable trait.  Similar relationships to anxiety have been replicated in 
other family and prospective studies (Biederman et al., 1993; Biederman et al., 2001; 
Rosenbaum et al., 1991; Rosenbaum et al., 1988).  Behavioral inhibition has shown particularly 
consistent relationships with social anxiety; over the course of a four-year follow-up, inhibited 
children demonstrated increased social avoidance (i.e., solitary play) during laboratory peer-play 
observation (Asendorpf, 1991).  Longitudinal modeling of parent-rated behavioral inhibition and 
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anxiety symptomatology in children further revealed that social anxiety symptomatology was 
significantly predicted by behavioral inhibition (Muris, van Brakel, Artntz, & Schouten, 2011).   
Behavioral inhibition has also been linked with GAD and OCD.  Among adults, self-
reported neuroticism and propensity for BIS activation predicted GAD symptoms over a 2-year 
period, and this prediction was stronger than for social anxiety (Brown, 2007).  Likewise, adults 
with clinical or subclinical OCD symptoms self-reported greater sensitivity to punishment 
compared to controls (Fullana et al., 2004).  Sensitivity to punishment is synonymous with 
Gray’s (1982) conception of the BIS.  Similarly, two studies have noted adolescents’ socially-
oriented behavioral inhibition was moderately-to-strongly correlated with worry and GAD 
symptoms, but was inconsistently related to OCD symptoms (i.e., unrelated in one study and 
weakly related in another; Muris, Merckelbach, Schmidt, Gadet, & Bogie, 2001; Muris, 
Merckelbach, Wessel, & van de Ven, 1999).  Children’s self-rated general propensity for BIS 
activation has also been correlated with GAD symptomatology ratings (Vervoort et al., 2010).   
Limited evidence also suggests a relationship between behavioral inhibition and 
depressive symptomatology, though the relationship is not as robust as with anxiety.  A 26-year 
longitudinal study demonstrated behaviorally inhibited children were at an increased risk for 
developing depression later in adolescence (Jaffee et al., 2002).  Similarly, adolescents’ socially-
oriented behavioral inhibition and general propensity for BIS activation demonstrated moderate-
to-strong correlations with self-reported depressive symptoms (Coplan et al., 2006; Muris, 
Meesters, de Kanter, & Timmerman, 2005; Muris, Merckelbach et al., 2001; Muris et al., 1999; 
Vervoort et al., 2010).  Linkages between BIS and depressive symptoms have been noted among 
adults (Brown, 2007; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2003; Jorm et al., 1999; Kasch, 
Rottenberg, Arnow, Gotlib, 2002).  
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The combination of high behavioral inhibition and low behavioral approach is a proposed 
vulnerability for depressive disorders, similar to the tripartite model’s combination of low 
positive affectivity and high negative affectivity (Depue & Iacono, 1989; Kasch et al., 2002).  
Lower self-reported BAS activation in adults predicted depression symptoms after 8 months 
even when controlling for initial depression severity (Kasch et al., 2002).  Additionally, negative 
correlations between self-reported propensity for BAS activation and measures of depressive 
symptomatology have been noted in children (Coplan et al., 2006) and adults (Campbell-Sills et 
al., 2004; Kasch et al., 2002).  However, other studies have found no correlations between BAS 
propensity and depressive symptoms (Johnson et al., 2003; Jorm et al., 1999; Muris et al., 2005; 
Vervoort et al., 2010).  Overall, consistent evidence has been found to suggest that BIS 
activation is a trait vulnerability for internalizing disorders.  Propensity for low BAS activation 
has theoretical support as a vulnerability for depression, though current evidence suggests this 
relationship may be weak and/or less consistent than propensity for BIS activation. 
 
1.4 Cognitive Vulnerabilities 
 In addition to a biological predisposition, the Triple Vulnerabilities Model proposed a 
psychological vulnerability for anxiety conceptualized as a broad schema consisting of a lack of 
perceived control and low predictability of experiences.  However, others have expanded this 
vulnerability to include specific cognitive factors that serve to enhance, specify, and maintain 
emotional reactions.  A cognitive model of fear and phobia by Armfield (2006) resembled the 
Triple Vulnerabilities Model, though it expanded the general psychological factor to include 
cognitive traits such as propensity for disgust and perceived level of threat.  Though the model 
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was developed specifically to explain the development of phobias, specific cognitive processes 
may also present vulnerabilities to other internalizing domains. 
Riskind and Alloy (2006) outlined four characteristics used to determine a general 
cognitive vulnerability: 1) temporal precedence (i.e., presence of the trait before the disorder 
onset), 2) temporal stability (i.e., a trait versus state characteristic), 3) demonstration of construct 
validity to the disorder in question, and 4) if theorized to be specific to a disorder, demonstrated 
discriminant validity to other disorders.  Three cognitive traits that meet these characteristics are 
1) anxiety sensitivity, 2) intolerance of uncertainty, and 3) thought suppression.  Each is 
discussed below and their relations to internalizing symptom domains are highlighted. 
 
1.4.1 Anxiety Sensitivity 
 Anxiety sensitivity is defined as the tendency to be concerned with or fearful of 
physiological arousal due to possible physical and/or psychosocial consequences of the arousal 
(e.g., rapid heart rate could signal a heart attack, or sweating could be embarrassing; Reiss, 
1991).  Anxiety sensitivity is therefore, a propensity to misinterpret physiological arousal as 
threatening.  Several researchers have proposed anxiety sensitivity as a cognitive vulnerability 
for internalizing disorders (Li & Zinbarg, 2007; Olatunji & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2009; Reiss, 1991; 
Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 1992).  Supporting this notion, anxiety sensitivity has been shown to 
be partly heritable (Stein, Jang, & Livesley, 1999), has been predicted by negative affectivity 
(Norton et al., 2003; Norton & Mehta, 2007) and is moderately-to-strongly correlated with 
negative affectivity (Bernstein, Zvolensky, Vujanovic, & Moos, 2009; Joiner et al., 2002), 
neuroticism (Cox, Borger, Taylor, Fuentes, & Ross, 1999), and propensity for BIS activation (Li 
& Zinbarg, 2007).  Therefore, anxiety sensitivity may be derived from general vulnerabilities. 
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As its name implies, anxiety sensitivity has shown moderate-to-strong correlations with 
children’s and adults’ self-reported non-specific anxiety symptoms (Joiner et al., 2002; Taylor, 
Koch, Woody, & McLean, 1996; Weems, Hammond-Laurence, Silverman, & Ginsburg, 1998) 
as well as specific anxiety symptoms.  Studies have most often examined anxiety sensitivity’s 
relation and contribution to panic disorder, due to conceptual similarities with physiological 
phenomenology of panic attacks.  Prospective studies have demonstrated anxiety sensitivity is a 
predictor of the development of panic symptomatology in adults and children (Hayward, Killen, 
Kraemer & Taylor, 2000; Li & Zinbarg, 2007; Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997; Weems, 
Hayward, Killen, & Taylor, 2002).  Anxiety sensitivity has also been investigated within social 
anxiety; socially phobic adults (without comorbid panic or post-traumatic stress disorders) have 
demonstrated higher anxiety sensitivity than non-anxious controls (Taylor et al., 1996).  
Likewise, a meta-analysis found that social phobia is associated with increased anxiety 
sensitivity compared to non-clinical controls and is consistent with levels in other internalizing 
domains, with the exception of panic and post-traumatic stress disorders (Olatunji & Wolitzky-
Taylor, 2009).  Specific domains of anxiety sensitivity have also contributed significant variance 
to social fears, (Belcher & Peters, 2009). 
Relationships between anxiety sensitivity and OCD have been mixed.  In one study using 
a clinical sample of adults, anxiety sensitivity explained a small amount of variance in OCD 
symptoms, after controlling for depression and other cognitive factors (Calamari, Rector, 
Woodard, Cohen, & Chik, 2008).  Likewise, among a non-clinical undergraduate sample, OCD 
symptoms were predicted by anxiety sensitivity (Sexton et al., 2003).  In contrast, two path 
models (Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton et al., 2005) found no significant relationship between 
anxiety sensitivity and OCD symptoms.  Still, elevated anxiety sensitivity has been noted among 
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adult OCD patients, compared with non-anxious controls (Taylor et al., 1992).  A strength of this 
comparison is that comorbid panic and/or post-traumatic stress diagnoses were excluded from 
the other groups, lessoning potential influences from comorbidity.  Overall, meta-analytic 
findings suggested that anxiety sensitivity within OCD is greater than non-clinical controls and is 
comparable to most other internalizing disorders excluding panic disorder (Olatunji & Wolitzky-
Taylor, 2009). 
The majority of research examining anxiety sensitivity in those with GAD has found 
weak or no relationships between the constructs; three regression analyses, one with a sample of 
clinical adults, another with a community sample of adults, and the third with a community 
sample of children, found no predictive relationships to worry symptoms (Chorpita & Daleiden, 
2000; Norton et al., 2005; Sexton et al., 2003).  Likewise, only a moderate correlation between 
GAD symptoms and anxiety sensitivity has been noted in children (Weems, Hammond-
Laurence, Silverman, & Ferguson, 1997).  However, a meta-analysis of adult studies indicated 
anxiety sensitivity in GAD is greater compared to non-clinical controls but is generally 
equivalent to other, non-panic internalizing domains (Olatunji & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2009).  
A limited number of studies have noted relationships between depressive 
symptomatology and anxiety sensitivity; predictive models in a clinical sample of adults noted 
no such relationship (Norton et al., 2005; Otto, Pollack, Fava, Uccello, & Rosenbaum, 1995). 
Adolescents’ and children’s ratings of anxiety sensitivity, however, have demonstrated 
relationships with depression symptoms (Lewis et al., 2010; Weems et al., 1997).  However, 
when anxiety symptoms were controlled for, these relationships were weak or non-significant 
(Joiner et al., 2002; Weems et al., 1997).  Therefore, anxiety sensitivity does not appear to be a 
robust predictor of depression or GAD, but is relevant to social anxiety and OCD. 
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1.4.2 Intolerance Of Uncertainty 
 Like anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty has been proposed as a general 
cognitive feature of several internalizing disorders (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, 
Mulvogue et al., 2012; Gentes & Rusio, 2011; Koerner & Dugas, 2008; Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group, 1997). Intolerance of uncertainty is the tendency to perceive, 
interpret, and respond cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally to uncertain or ambiguous 
situations as if they are negative or threatening (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004).  The 
construct is conceptually similar to the psychological vulnerability of the Triple Vulnerabilities 
Model (i.e., low perceived control and a general belief in the unpredictable).  Intolerance of 
uncertainty is thought to be a stable, future-oriented cognitive trait, rather than being present-
oriented and state dependent (Carleton, Mulvogue et al., 2012).  The latent structure of 
intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to be dimensional in nature rather than categorical, 
supporting the notion of a continuous vulnerability trait (Carleton, Weeks et al., 2012).  
Measures of intolerance of uncertainty have demonstrated good reliability correlations over 
periods of up to 5 weeks, suggesting relative temporal stability of the trait (Dugas, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994).  Further, among 
adults and adolescents, intolerance of uncertainty has been predicted by negative 
affectivity/neuroticism, making it a likely secondary vulnerability for internalizing 
psychopathology (Boelen, Vrinssen, & van Tulder, 2010; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Sexton et al., 
2003; van der Heiden et al., 2010).  
 The largest body of research on intolerance of uncertainty has been applied to GAD; the 
construct is considered a key feature of the disorder (Koerner & Dugas, 2006).  Among youth, a 
5-year prospective follow-up found adolescents’ intolerance of uncertainty was predictive of 
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worry longitudinally (Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski; 2012).  Similarly, experimental 
manipulation of situational uncertainty (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000) and increased 
intolerance of uncertainty self-talk (Rosen and Knäuper, 2009) resulted in greater self-reported 
worry, suggesting a causal relationship.  Likewise, several non-causal studies among adults and 
children have demonstrated intolerance of uncertainty predicted GAD symptoms, even when 
controlling for trait negative affect/neuroticism in some studies (Boelen et al., 2010; Dugas et al., 
2007; Freeston et al., 1994; Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Kertz & Woodruff-Borden, 
2013; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton et al., 2005; Sexton et al., 2003; van der Heiden et al., 
2010).  Lastly, those with either primary or secondary GAD endorsed the greatest levels of 
intolerance of uncertainty compared with other anxiety disorders and non-clinical controls 
(Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Ladouceur et al., 1999).  Overall, evidence suggests a 
moderate-to-strong relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and GAD in both adults and 
children. 
Depression and GAD share considerable conceptual and statistical overlap (e.g., 
comorbidity, genetic risk, physiological symptoms, cognitive interference; see Mennin et al., 
2008).  Not surprisingly then, intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to have significant 
relationships with depression, though findings are mixed.  Among adults, predictive relationships 
with depression have been found in some studies (Dugas et al., 1997; Dugas et al., 2004; 
McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011; Norton et al., 2005); however, two other studies, one with 
community adolescents and the other among undergraduates, have not supported such a 
relationship (Boelen et al., 2010; Norton & Mehta, 2007).  A meta-analysis of correlational 
studies found a moderate overall relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and depression 
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that was comparable to those found in OCD and lower than that noted in GAD (Gentes & 
Ruscio, 2011).   
Intolerance of uncertainty was indentified as one of the major cognitive features of OCD 
(OCCWG, 1997).  Obsessive-compulsive symptoms have significantly contributed to intolerance 
of uncertainty scores (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009).  Likewise, intolerance of uncertainty has 
predicted OCD symptoms among clinical and non-clinical adults (Fergus & Wu, 2010; Lind & 
Boschen, 2009; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011; Norton & Mehta, 2007), even when controlling for 
worry, depression, and anxiety sensitivity (Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998).  Interestingly, 
analyses examining OCD symptom subtypes found checking and repeating compulsions 
predicted intolerance of uncertainty, where other OCD symptoms were not related (Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003).  A meta-analysis of correlational studies indicated 
intolerance of uncertainty is moderately-to-strongly related to OCD symptoms; however, this 
relationship was weaker compared to that found with GAD (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011).  Therefore, 
intolerance of uncertainty appears to significantly contribute to OCD but may have a more 
specific relationship with symptom subtypes than the general relationship in GAD.  To date, no 
information regarding intolerance of uncertainty in childhood OCD symptoms was found in the 
literature.  
A recent development has been the examination of intolerance of uncertainty in social 
anxiety.  While not specifically implicated in theories of social phobia, diagnostic 
conceptualizations of the disorder include the experience of fear of embarrassment or negative 
judgments from others (APA, 2000).  Therefore, intolerance of uncertainty may play a role in 
social anxiety due to the unpredictable or ambiguous nature of social interactions.  Studies have 
noted a predictive relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety among 
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clinically referred (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011) and non-clinical undergraduate samples (Boelen 
& Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Whiting, 
Jenkins, May, Rudy, Davis, & Reuther, 2013).  A similar relationship was found in adolescents 
as well (Boelen et al., 2010).  Strengthening these findings is that these relationships were found 
when controlling for comorbid and/or correlated traits such as GAD and OCD symptoms, fear of 
negative evaluation, and trait affect.  Interestingly, change in intolerance of uncertainty, resulting 
from a cognitive-behavioral group therapy with a focus on intolerance of uncertainty, predicted 
treatment response for social phobia, suggesting a causal relationship (Mahoney & McEvoy, 
2012).  Overall, the literature supports the role of intolerance of uncertainty as a cognitive trait 
associated to varying degrees with several internalizing domains including GAD, depression, 
OCD, and social phobia. 
 
1.4.3 Thought Suppression 
Thought suppression, or purposefully attempting to avoid and control unwanted thoughts, 
may be another cognitive vulnerability for internalizing problems.  Deleterious effects of thought 
suppression and its associations to psychopathology were first hypothesized by Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter and White (1987).  In their influential study, adult participants were told to 
either think of a white bear or avoid thinking of a white bear (suppression), followed by a period 
of engaging in the opposite thought condition.  Participants who engaged in thought suppression 
demonstrated greater frequency of intrusive thoughts after ending suppression compared with 
those who did not engage in thought suppression.  The authors termed this paradox, the Rebound 
Effect and hypothesized similar processes may occur within internalizing psychopathology, such 
that engagement in thought suppression leads to increased expression of unwanted thoughts.  
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Though results and methodologies vary, numerous experimental studies have supported the 
Rebound Effect in a variety of adult samples (Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991; Clark, Winton, & 
Thynn, 1993; Janeck & Calamari, 1999; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Wegner & Gold, 1995). 
Others have proposed a second effect, termed the Immediate Enhancement Effect, where 
the increase in target thought expression occurs during active suppression, due to increased 
vigilance for the thought (Wegner & Erber, 1992).  Like the Rebound Effect, the Immediate 
Enhancement Effect has support in the literature but results vary by methodology (Harvey & 
Bryant, 1999; Janeck & Calamari, 1999; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Muris, de Jongh, 
Merkelbach, Postema, & Vet, 1998; Rassin, Merkelbach, & Muris, 1997; Salkovskis & 
Reynolds, 1994).  A meta-analysis of experimental studies suggested limited support for the 
Immediate Enhancement Effect, overall, but small-to-moderate effect sizes for the Rebound 
Effect (Abramowitz, Tolin, Street, 2001).  Regardless of the timing of the effect (i.e., during vs. 
following active suppression), thought suppression appears to increase the occurrence of 
unwanted thoughts.   
The frequent experience of intrusive or negative thoughts is a diagnostic feature common 
to all internalizing disorders.  Researchers have particularly noted similarities between intrusive 
or ruminative thought processes in OCD, GAD, and depression, suggesting common underlying 
cognitive processes for these disorders (Brown, Moras, Zinbarg & Barlow, 1993; Morillo, 
Belloch, & Gracía-Soriano, 2007; Tolin, Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2006; Turner, Beidel, & 
Stanley, 1992; Wells & Morrison, 1994).  Similarly, an experimental study demonstrated thought 
suppression completely meditated the relationship between negative affectivity and intrusive 
thought experiences (Lynch, Schneider, Rosenthal, & Cheavens, 2007).  Therefore, thought 
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suppression may be a secondary cognitive trait for disorders involving intrusive thought 
experiences as their core features.  
Thought suppression has been conceptualized as being either adaptive or maladaptive 
depending upon the strategies used to control unwanted thoughts (Wells & Davies, 1994).  
Adaptive or neutral strategies for controlling unwanted thoughts are believed to include 
distraction from the thought, discussion of the thought with another person, and reappraising the 
thought’s validity, implications, or likelihood.  Maladaptive strategies include worrying – either 
as a distraction from the target thought or as a means of problem solving – and self-punishment 
(i.e., performing an unpleasant action in response to the thought).  As described below, 
maladaptive thought suppression has been associated with psychopathology, while adaptive 
strategies are either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with internalizing psychopathology.   
 Obsessive-compulsive disorder is conceptually defined partly by the experience of 
actively attempting to “ignore or suppress” (p. 462, APA, 2000) intrusive obsessions or 
compulsions.  Likewise, cognitive models of OCD propose thought suppression is a principal 
feature of the disorder; Rachman (1998) outlined a cognitive model of obsessions in which 
distorted beliefs in the significance of intrusive thoughts leads to heightened aversiveness of the 
thought.  Heightened aversiveness then prompts engagement in avoidance and/or neutralization 
actions, which includes thought suppression.  Parkinson and Rachman (1981) noted that the 
Rebound Effect is thought to increase the frequency of intrusive thoughts but also may prevent 
habituation thereby maintaining the obsession.  Salkovskis (1996) further suggested that 
overreliance upon thought suppression taxes cognitive resources, leading to poor inhibitory 
control of thoughts and compulsions, thus the rebound or immediate enhancement effects occur.   
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Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski, and Foa (2002) compared the frequency of thought 
intrusions between those with OCD, those with social anxiety, and non-anxious controls.  The 
Immediate Enhancement Effect was evidenced among those with OCD but not among those with 
social anxiety or no anxiety.  It is notable that the effect was only seen in those with OCD, 
suggesting thought suppression differentiates between OCD and social phobia.  Studies have also 
found total engagement in thought suppression and engagement the maladaptive suppression 
strategies (i.e., worry and punishment) are related to OCD symptoms among clinical and non-
clinical adults (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Kalsy, & Tolin, 2003; Amir, Cashman, & Foa, 1997; 
Tolin, Worhunsky, Brady, & Maltby, 2007; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; Wells & Davies, 1994).  
Relatively no information on thought suppression in youth is currently known; until recently, a 
measure of thought suppression strategies had not been developed for youth.  An initial 
investigation of such a measure among community adolescents supported associations between 
total thought suppression engagement, use of maladaptive thought suppression strategies, and 
OCD symptomatology (Whiting, May, Rudy, & Davis, 2014).  
Thought suppression is also conceptually related to GAD; the principal feature of GAD is 
the repeated experience of intrusive thoughts in the form of uncontrollable worries (APA, 2000).  
As with OCD, several cognitive models of GAD have included thought suppression processes, 
often referred to as cognitive avoidance.  Notably, Borkovec’s Avoidance Model of Worry and 
GAD theorized that worry functions to prevent exposure to feared stimuli, such as negatively 
valenced mental imagery (1994; Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004).  According to the model, 
worry is a less aversive and less activating linguistic representation of the more distressing visual 
cognition.  Engaging in worry may then reduce arousal and distress.  This type of avoidance 
prevents habituation and serves to maintain the anxiety.  Other models of GAD have also 
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included cognitive avoidance and/or maladaptive emotional coping strategies similar to some 
thought suppression strategies (Dugas et al., 1997; Ellis & Hudson, 2010; Mennin et al., 2005; 
Wells, 1995).  
 Experimentally, Becker, Rink, Roth, and Margraf (1998) found significantly more 
intrusive, personally relevant worries following suppression of negative thoughts among adults 
with GAD compared to adults with social phobia and non-anxious controls.  Interestingly, 
emotionally neutral thoughts did not produce group differences, suggesting only suppression of 
aversive thoughts is associated with GAD.  Likewise, frequency of thought suppression and 
endorsement of maladaptive suppression strategies are related to worry symptoms in clinical and 
non-clinical adults (Coles & Heimberg, 2005; Wells & Carter, 2009; Wells & Davies, 1994).  
Among adolescents, total and maladaptive thought suppression, and avoidance of thought 
triggers each explained unique variance in worry (Gosselin et al., 2007).  However, another study 
using a variant measure of thought suppression did not find a relationship between adolescents’ 
worry and broad thought suppression when other cognitive variables were included in the model 
(Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003).  Therefore, the evidence suggests cognitive avoidance is 
a factor related to GAD, though the relationship among adolescents is not well explored. 
 Cognitive models of depression place great emphasis on intrusive rumination about 
negative past experiences and subsequent cognitive interpretations of these ruminations, such as 
attributions regarding self-concept and unrealistic expectations (i.e., catastrophizing, selective 
abstraction, misattribution of personal responsibility, etc.; Beck, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979).  Poor thought control via ineffective thought suppression processes are 
hypothesized to contribute to the maintenance of rumination and depression (Wenzlaff, Wegner, 
& Roper, 1988).  An experimental study found depressed college students experienced the 
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Rebound Effect for negatively valenced thoughts, while no effect was seen among non-depressed 
participants (Wenzloff et al., 1988).  The authors also noted adaptive thought suppression (i.e., 
thinking of something positive instead) reduced intrusions compared with negative distraction 
used more often by the depressed group.  In two longitudinal studies, non-depressed adults, who 
endorsed frequently engaging in thought suppression, reported increased rumination and 
depression symptoms 7-10 weeks later; however, this effect only occurred when there was an 
interaction with stress (Beevers & Meyer, 2004; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003).  Non-experimental 
research has found a relatively consistent relationship between depression symptoms and thought 
suppression frequency (Reynolds & Wells, 1999; Watkins & Moulds, 2009; Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994; Wenzlaff & Rude, 2002).  Likewise, comparisons between symptom measures show 
similar patterns of association between thought suppression and depression, GAD, OCD, and 
post-traumatic stress symptoms (McKay & Greisberg, 2002; Reynolds & Wells, 1999; Wells & 
Carter, 2009).  Overall, the literature suggests thought suppression is a cognitive feature of 
depression, OCD, and GAD and may serve to increase intrusive thought experiences in these 
populations.   
Interestingly, evidence suggests thought suppression is not associated with social phobia.  
Currently, the applicability of thought suppression to child and adolescent internalizing disorders 
is largely unknown due to lack of empirical study in this area.  Likewise, thought suppression has 
not been included in comprehensive models of trait and cognitive vulnerabilities, even among 
adults (described below). 
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1.5 Synthesis of Hierarchical Models and Cognitive Vulnerabilities 
 
 The Tripartite, IHM, and Triple Vulnerabilities Models largely propose analogous 
heuristics for the structure of underlying common and differentiating factors of internalizing 
disorders.  Overall, these models describe at least two levels of traits, the first of which are 
stable, general indicators, such as proclivity for positive and negative affect and 
temperament/personality traits (e.g., neuroticism, extroversion, inhibition.).  The second tier 
consists of narrower traits, which are considered to be stable and broadly applicable to several, 
but not all, internalizing disorders.  Examples of these mid-level factors vary by model; however, 
the most common factors examined in the literature are two cognitive processes discussed above: 
anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty.  
 Sexton and colleagues (2003) incorporated elements of the previously described 
theoretical models and empirical studies of cognitive traits into a hierarchical regression-based 
path model.  Unless performed prospectively, path analysis cannot directly infer causal or 
developmental relationships.  Instead, their model is best conceptualized as examining the 
convergent and discriminating relationships of hypothesized vulnerability factors at a single 
moment in time.  The hierarchical path model consisted of three levels (see page 1 of 
Addendum); in accordance with broad theoretical models, the first level included trait 
neuroticism, which was hypothesized to explain significant variance in higher-order cognitive 
factors as well as symptomatology directly (i.e., partial, but not full mediation).   
The second level of the model consisted of two trait cognitive factors, thought of as 
vulnerabilities for internalizing disorders: anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty.  The 
inclusion of these variables as second-level predictor represents a synthesis of the theoretical and 
empirical literature.  First, the IHM’s notion of converging but also discriminating common 
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factors was represented.  The Triple Vulnerabilities Model’s proposed psychological 
vulnerability (i.e., increased beliefs in uncertainty) also relate directly to intolerance of 
uncertainty.  Likewise, the vast literature demonstrating common relationships of cognitive traits 
in the internalizing disorders was replicated and summarized within a single model.  The 
predicted relationships of anxiety sensitivity were based upon theory and empirical evidence; 
Sexton and colleagues predicted anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty would 
differentially contribute to four anxiety domains: panic symptoms, health 
anxiety/hypochondriacal fears, OCD symptoms, and GAD/worry symptoms.  Specific 
hypothesized paths included a link between anxiety sensitivity and panic symptoms as well as 
health anxiety.  Intolerance of uncertainty was expected to contribute to GAD symptoms only. 
Results of the path model among a sample of non-clinical undergraduates supported the 
hypotheses, with the exception that neuroticism was not a significant predictor of health anxiety.  
Further examination of a full predictive model (i.e., all possible paths are drawn) revealed a 
significant relationship between anxiety sensitivity and OCD symptoms that fully mediated the 
relationship with neuroticism.  Intolerance of uncertainty remained only related to pathological 
worry (i.e., GAD symptoms).  
Norton and colleagues (2005) replicated and expanded the Sexton et al. (2003) model, by 
including positive affectivity and depressive symptoms, as well as conducting the study within a 
clinical sample of adults with internalizing disorders.  The expanded model incorporated the full 
distinction of the Tripartite Model’s negative and positive affectivity in addition to the elements 
of the Sexton et al. (2003) model (see page 2 of addendum).  Accordingly, the new model 
hypothesized positive affectivity would contribute to depression symptoms in addition to 
negative affectivity.  Based on some empirical evidence, positive affectivity was also expected to 
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contribute to GAD/worry symptomatology.  A hypothesized path was also expected between 
intolerance of uncertainty and depressive symptoms.  To replicate the previous model, negative 
affectivity was expected to relate to the same internalizing domains as found by Sexton et al., 
(2003).  
Using the same regression-based methodology, the expanded model noted some 
important differences compared with the original.  First, negative affectivity did not significantly 
predict anxiety sensitivity nor did it predict intolerance of uncertainty.  Low positive affectivity 
predicted depression and GAD symptoms as expected.  Likewise, anxiety sensitivity and 
intolerance of uncertainty maintained their predictive relationships with panic and health anxiety 
but not with OCD.  Unlike the previous model, negative affectivity in the clinical sample 
contributed to health anxiety.  Overall, the structural relationships in the Sexton et al. (2003) 
non-clinical sample were upheld in the Norton et al. (2005) clinical sample, suggesting 
differential contribution of intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety sensitivity to several 
internalizing domains.  
There were three primary limitations to the replication and original models, however; 
first, social anxiety was not included as an outcome.  Second, the regression-based 
methodologies used in both studies precluded modeling correlational relationships between the 
higher order predictor variables and limited the ability to examine overall goodness of fit of the 
models.  Lastly, only single indicator variables were use in the regression models; using several 
instruments to indicate latent variables within a structural equation model, better ensures 
construct validity.  Therefore, Norton and Mehta (2007) conducted a replication and extension of 
the Norton et al. (2005) model using structural equation modeling of latent variables (see page 3 
of addendum).  As with the model from the clinical sample, negative and positive affectivity, 
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anxiety sensitivity, and intolerance of uncertainty were differential indicators of internalizing 
psychopathology.  However, the model included social anxiety symptoms in place of health 
anxiety/hypochondriacal fears.  Hypothesized paths from the Norton and colleagues (2005) 
model were modeled, along with an additional path between intolerance of uncertainty and OCD 
symptoms, based on previous research.  Paths were expected between negative affectivity and all 
internalizing symptom categories.  Likewise positive affectivity was expected to contribute to 
depressive symptoms and social anxiety.  Anxiety sensitivity was expected to contribute to 
panic, social anxiety, and OCD symptoms.  Lastly, intolerance of uncertainty was modeled to 
contribute to all measured symptomatology.  
Overall, the structural model produced a good fit for the observed data; however, some 
paths were not supported despite this good fit.  Anxiety sensitivity did not contribute 
significantly to social anxiety as expected, nor did it contribute to OCD symptoms as previously 
found.  Likewise, positive affectivity did not significantly contribute to GAD/worry or social 
anxiety symptoms.  
The relationships across this series of three models are largely consistent for some 
variables and less so for others; negative affectivity/neuroticism consistently predicted GAD and 
depressive symptoms and positive affectivity was a consistent predictor of depressive symptoms.  
Intolerance of uncertainty was a consistent predictor of GAD and depression symptoms as well.  
Other paths varied across the models.  Among non-clinical participants in the Sexton et al. 
(2003) and Norton and Mehta (2007) studies, negative affectivity predicted anxiety sensitivity 
and intolerance of uncertainty; however, this was not replicated in the clinical sample (Norton et 
al., 2005).  Negative affectivity did not relate to OCD symptoms in two of the three models, 
suggesting a weak contribution to OCD overall.  Intolerance of uncertainty predicted OCD 
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symptoms in the structural equation model by Norton and Mehta (2007) but not in the other 
undergraduate sample by Sexton et al. (2003), suggesting an unstable or weak relationship.  
Anxiety sensitivity predicted OCD symptoms in the first model, but was not replicated in the 
subsequent models.  Lastly, as social anxiety was only modeled once, the stability of the 
relationships modeled is unknown.  
These regression and structural models are important examples of the IHM heuristic as 
well as the growing consensus that anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty have broad 
relations to internalizing disorders.  However, two clear limitations of these models exist. First, 
these models have only been conducted within adult samples, limiting their generalizability to 
children and adolescents.  Therefore, it is currently unknown if these structural relationships in 
adult psychopathology are adequate representations of childhood psychopathology.  Second, 
other potentially important contributions to internalizing psychopathology have yet to be 
modeled in this way, namely BIS and BAS, as implicated in the Triple Vulnerabilities Model, 
and the cognitive variable, thought suppression.   
 
1.6 Rationale  
 The Tripartite, Triple Vulnerability, and IHM are commonly cited theories for describing 
the similarities between internalizing disorders.  Research has demonstrated support for trait 
affective and personality vulnerabilities among adults and children.  However, models of 
behavioral inhibition/activation and secondary cognitive factors have been fewer, have focused 
primarily on anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty, and have almost exclusively been 
conducted with adult samples.  Relatively little empirical attention has been given to cognitive 
processes in child and adolescent internalizing psychopathology despite being conceptualized as 
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one of the major components of such disorders (see Davis, May, & Whiting, 2011).  A greater 
understanding of the contribution and differential relationships of cognitive factors to child and 
adolescent psychopathology may lead to better informed interventions.  For example, cognitive-
behavioral treatments for GAD (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000) and social anxiety (Mahoney & 
McEvory, 2012) in adults included specific elements for reducing intolerance of uncertainty and 
have been found to be effective treatments.  Therefore, the current study proposes to expand the 
literature by replicating and extending the Norton and Mehta (2007) hierarchical model of 
general affective and trait cognitive predictors of internalizing symptomatology among a sample 
of adolescents.  The aims of the proposed study are twofold: 1) test a direct replication of the 
adult model within a sample of youth, and 2) extend the replication model by including trait 
behavioral responding (i.e., BIS/BAS) as a higher-order predictor and explore thought 
suppression’s influence as an additional cognitive factor of internalizing symptoms.  
 
1.7. Hypotheses 
 Figure 1 illustrates the proposed hierarchical model for the current study.  In the model, 
outcome variables are intended to approximate the various primary symptoms of their respective 
disorders.  In accordance with the various models and statistical findings described above, trait 
affect and behavioral predispositions are included as the first level of the proposed model, 
followed by cognitive factors.  The hypothesized model was based upon the relationships 
modeled by Norton and Mehta (2007) due to finding an overall good structural fit, despite some 
inconsistencies with previous models. 
Hypothesis 1: Negative affectivity and BIS propensity are hypothesized to have 
significant paths with all internalizing symptom domains.  
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Figure 1. Proposed Hypothesized Model.  Notes: Solid lines denote positive coefficients; dashed lines denote negative coefficients.   
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Hypothesis 2: Negative affectivity and BIS propensity are hypothesized to predict anxiety 
sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty, and frequency of thought suppression.   
Hypothesis 3: Low positive affectivity and low BAS propensity are expected to 
contribute to social anxiety and depressive symptoms.   
Hypothesis 4: Anxiety sensitivity is expected to contribute to social anxiety and OCD 
symptoms.   
Hypothesis 5: Intolerance of uncertainty is hypothesized to relate to all internalizing 
symptom domains.   
Hypothesis 6: Total frequency of thought suppression is expected to demonstrate 
pathways to OCD, GAD, and depression symptoms.  
Hypothesis 7: The hypothesized model is expected to explain equivalent variance to that 
of a fully identified model (see Figure 2), indicating the hypothesized model is parsimonious 
while explaining the most amount of variance. 
Hypothesis 8: A direct replication of the Norton and Mehta (2007) model (see Figure 3) 
is expected to demonstrate the same pattern of associations between trait affect, intolerance of 
uncertainty, anxiety sensitivity, and internalizing psychopathology, excluding panic disorder.
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Figure 2. Proposed Fully Identified Model. Notes: thick, grey paths are not hypothesized but included in the fully identified model.   
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Figure 3. Proposed Replication Model.  Notes: adapted from Norton and colleagues (2007).  Solid lines denote positive coefficients; 
dashed lines denote negative coefficient 
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2. METHODS 
2.1 Sample Size Recommendations and A Priori Power Analysis 
Several recommendations exist for the minimum sample size required for path analysis 
using structural equation modeling; a commonly used metric is a ratio of the number of subjects 
to free parameters.  On the upper end, Kline (2011) and Tanaka (1987) have suggested an ideal 
ratio of 20:1, though this is often impractically high.  An alternative for exploratory or 
preliminary investigations - such as the intent of this study - is to utilize regression-based path 
modeling (see section 3. Analytic Plan), which allows for smaller sample sizes.  An a priori 
power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  With 
6 predictors (most complex planned regression equation) and a conservative small effect size of 
f2=0.25 (Cohen, 1988), the a priori analysis revealed n=90 would achieve adequate power, set at 
minimum of .95.  Using the observed effect sizes displayed in tables displayed in Chapter 4, the 
smallest observed power across all regression analyses was .97.  
 
2.2 Sample and Recruitment 
The only formal inclusion criterion was chronological age between 12 and 17 years 
inclusively.  Adolescents were excluded from participation if they self-reported inadequate 
ability to speak or read English.  No potential participant met this exclusion criterion.   
Participants were 105 community adolescents, 103 of which were recruited in Louisiana 
private schools and two from youth sporting events held in Connecticut (mean age = 15.61; SD = 
1.63; range = 12-17).  Girls comprised 67.6% of the sample.  Participants predominantly self-
identified as White/Caucasian (83.8%; n=88).  The remainder identified as Black/African 
American (11.4%; n=12) or Asian (1.9%; n=2).  Three participants did not report racial identity.  
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Independent of race, 3.8% (n=3) of participants self-identified as Hispanic.  Diagnostically, 
15.2% (n=15) of the sample self-reported a history of one or more psychological diagnoses as 
follows: attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (n=6), an anxiety disorder (n=8), depression 
(n=6), and Aspergers Syndrome (n=2).  Independent of self-reported diagnoses, 19 participants 
reported a history of receiving psychological therapy or counseling.   
 
2.3 Procedure 
 The Louisiana State University Institutional Review Board approved this study and its 
consenting/assenting process.  Parents provided written informed consent for their child to 
participate and adolescents provided written informed assent.  Individuals with questions could 
contact the investigators by email, which some parents did to clarify age requirements prior to 
providing consent.  All students at the 6th grade level of participating schools were distributed 
consent forms, though some may not have turned 12 years of age yet.  Those who contacted the 
investigators for age clarification were told those under 12 years old could not participate, but 
were allowed to enter the gift-card drawing to be equitable (though none did so).  None 
contacted investigators regarding adverse events or concerns about participation.  Participants 
with parental consent then provided written assent and completed anonymous questionnaire 
packets individually or in small groups.   
A total of 12 schools in Louisiana were approached for recruitment and two agreed.  An 
additional 48 schools were approached in Connecticut, and five in Mississippi, though all either 
declined or did not respond to several attempts by the investigator to make contact.  One youth 
sports facility in Connecticut was also approached and permitted recruitment during public 
events.  Packets were distributed in one semi-public middle and high school (i.e., state funded 
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but requiring tuition and application for acceptance), one private secular school for girls (grades 
6-12), and one dual-enrollment high school psychology course at a public university in 
Louisiana.  Participation was also offered to spectators during two youth sporting events in 
Connecticut.  Packets were completed either at home, at the sporting events, or during class 
periods in schools.  Questionnaires took approximately 30-45 minutes to complete.  Measure 
packets were created in three different counterbalanced versions to minimize presentation order 
effects.  As an incentive, participants were offered the opportunity to enter a drawing to win one 
of ten, $10 gift cards to an online music store.  A random drawing, utilizing a random number 
generator, was held at the completion of data collection and the ten selected participants were 
each mailed a gift card. 
 
2.4 Measures 
Demographics questionnaire. A demographics questionnaire, created for this study, 
included questions regarding age, gender, grade level, and racial/ethnic self-identification.  
Additional questions regarding current and previous psychological diagnoses and psychological 
treatment were also included. 
Positive and Negative Affectivity Scale for Children (PANAS-C).  The PANAS-C 
(Laurent et al., 1999) is a 27-item self-report measure assessing children and adolescents’ 
propensity for experiencing differing emotional states.  The measure asks respondents to rate the 
degree to which they generally experience positive and negative emotions on a 5-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (not at all or very slightly) to 5 (extremely).  In addition to affective 
experience, the measure also contains items assessing physiological hyperarousal.  The PANAS-
C was developed as a downward extension of the Expanded Version of the Positive and Negative 
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Affectivity Scale for adults (Watson & Clark, 1994).  Items from the original measure were 
tested among fourth and eighth grade children for comprehension; any items frequently indicated 
as unfamiliar or not understood were eliminated.  The remaining items were examined in an 
exploratory factor analysis, which supported a two-factor structure measuring positive and 
negative affectivity.  Good (>.80) or excellent (>.90) internal consistency of the positive and 
negative affectivity factors has consistently been found among samples of children ranging in 
age from 7 – 18 years (Chorpita & Daleiden, 2002; Hughes & Kendall, 2009; Joiner & Lonigan, 
2000; Laurent et al., 1999).  Additionally, good convergent validity for both factors has been 
noted (i.e., positive affectivity negatively correlates with depression, while negative affectivity 
positively correlates with anxiety and depression; Hughes & Kendall, 2009; Joiner & Lonigan, 
2000; Laurent et al., 1999).  Comparisons with the Affect and Arousal Scales (Chorpita & 
Daleiden, 2002), an alternative measure of children’s positive and negative affect, also indicated 
moderate-to-strong correlations between the conceptually similar subscales, suggesting both 
convergent and construct validity (Chorpita & Daleiden, 2002).  In the current sample, the 
Positive Affectivity scale had an internal consistency of .88, while the Negative Affectivity scale 
was .89. 
Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales for Children (BIS/BAS-C).  The 
BIS/BAS-C (Muris et al., 2005) was developed as a downward extension of the adult BIS/BAS 
(Carver & White, 1994).  The BIS/BAS-C was designed to measure the sensitivity or propensity 
of BIS and BAS activation; to do this, the measure assesses affective reactions to reward and 
punishment, as well as self-reported behavioral responses to such stimuli.  The 20-item 
BIS/BAS-C is rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale between 1 (not true at all of me) and 4 (very 
true of me), with higher scores indicating greater propensity for activation.  A factor analysis 
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determined that the BIS/BAS-C has a two-factor structure, with BIS and BAS loading as 
separate factors (Bjørnebekk, 2009; Muris et al., 2005).  Adequate (>.70) to good (>.80) internal 
consistency of the BIS/BAS-C factors has been found among samples of children and 
adolescents ranging in age from 8-18 years (Bjørnebekk, 2009; Muris et al., 2005; Vervoort et 
al., 2010).  In the current sample, the BIS scale had an internal consistency of .77, while the BAS 
scale’s internal consistency was .84. 
Children’s Anxiety Sensitivity Index (CASI).  The CASI (Silverman, Fleisig, Rabian, & 
Peterson, 1991) is a downward extension of the adult Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss, Peterson, 
Gursky, & McNally, 1986).  The original CASI contained 18-items, which demonstrated a 
hierarchical factor structure with a single factor indicating general anxiety sensitivity and three 
sub-factors indicating fear of physiological arousal, fear of publically observable anxiety 
reactions, and fear of cognitive dyscontrol (Muris, Schmidt, Merckelbach, & Schouten, 2001; 
Silverman et al., 1999; Walsh, Stewart, McLaughlin, & Comeau, 2004; Wright et al., 2010).  
Internal consistency of the CASI has consistently been found to be in the good (>.80) range for 
the total score among children ranging in age from 6-17 years (Muris, Schmidt et al., 2001; 
Silverman, Ginsburg, & Goedhart, 1991; Silverman et al., 1999; Silverman, Goedhart, Barrett, & 
Turner, 2003; Walsh et al., 2004; Weems, Costa, Watts, Taylor, & Cannon, 2007; Weems et al., 
1998).  Likewise, convergence with measures of childhood anxiety and behavioral interoceptive 
tasks has been noted (Chorpita & Daleiden, 2000; Rabian, Embry, & MacIntyre, 1999; 
Silverman et al., 1991; Weems et al., 2007; Weems et al., 1998).  While a revised version (CASI-
R; Muris, 2002) has been developed and has promising psychometric properties, the CASI-R has 
not been widely tested or used in the literature to date.  Therefore the original CASI was used in 
the current study.  Internal consistency of the CASI in the current sample was .87.  
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Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children (IUSC).  The IUSC (Comer et al., 2009) is 
a 27-item self-report measure for children and adolescents.  Items on the IUSC were adapted 
from the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for adults (Freeston et al., 1994); modifications were 
made to reduce the metacognitive and linguistic complexity of the measure to be appropriate for 
children (see Comer et al., 2009 for details).  Items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1(not at all) to 6 (very much), with higher scores indicating greater intolerance of 
uncertainty.  The IUSC has not undergone factor analysis but was designed to yield a single 
score.  The IUSC is a recently developed instrument and therefore, has limited psychometric 
testing.  However, an initial examination of the measure indicated excellent (>.90) internal 
consistency for the total measure among clinical and non-clinical children and adolescents aged 
7-17 years (Comer et al., 2009).  Likewise, moderate-to-strong convergence was found with 
measures of anxiety, worry, and self-reported reassurance seeking behavior (Comer et al., 2009).  
Additionally, receiver operator curve analyses indicated that the IUSC had acceptable detection 
of children with anxiety and discrimination from community controls (Comer et al., 2009). The 
IUSC evidenced an internal consistency in the current sample of .93. 
Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ-A). The TCQ-A (Whiting, May et al., 
2014) is a 15-item measure of adolescents’ self-reported engagement in thought suppression.  
The TCQ-A is an adaptation of the Thought Control Questionnaire for adults (Wells & Davies, 
1994).  The TCQ and TCQ-A were designed to measure frequency of engaging in several 
thought suppression strategies.  The measure has been examined among adolescents aged 12-18 
years.  Adolescents rate the frequency at which they use each thought suppression strategy on a 
4-point Likert-type scale between 0 (never) and 3 (always).  Exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses revealed a 5-factor structure for the TCQ-A, each measuring a unique thought 
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suppression strategy: distraction (e.g., “I think about something good or happy instead”), social 
(e.g., “I ask a friend if they have similar thoughts”), reappraisal (e.g., “I tell myself, ‘it’s okay, 
it’s just a thought.’”), worry (e.g., “I think about a smaller problem I’m having instead.), and 
punishment (e.g., “I get mad or frustrated at myself for having the thought”; Whiting, May et al., 
2014).  Additionally, a total score is derived from summing all 15 items, which indicates overall 
frequency engaging in any thought suppression strategy; only the total score is proposed to be 
use in the current study.  Initial psychometric analyses of the TCQ-A revealed adequate (.75) 
internal consistency for the total scale, moderate-to-strong test-retest correlations, and expected 
convergence and divergence with measures of anxiety and externalizing symptoms respectively 
(Whiting, May et al., 2014).  However, the TCQ-A’s properties have yet to be replicated in other 
samples.  The total score of the TCQ-A demonstrated questionable internal consistency of .64 
(Kline, 1999).  However, instruments that measure behaviors with low base-rates or those that 
measure a range of distinct behaviors like the TCQ-A may still be informative, even with 
questionable internal consistency, as Cronbach alpha is often low in such cases due to the 
uniqueness of individual items (Cortina, 1993; Kline, 1999; Streiner, 2003).  
Social Anxiety Scale for Adolescents (SAS-A).  The SAS-A (La Greca & Lopez, 1998) is 
a self-report measure of social anxiety for adolescents.  The SAS-A is a modified version of the 
Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised (SASC-R; La Greca & Stone, 1993).  Modifications 
for the adolescent version were limited to alternate wording of references to childlike 
behaviors/terminology (i.e., “playing” or “kids”) to terminology relevant to adolescents (i.e., “do 
things” or “others”; see La Greca & Lopez, 1998).  Otherwise, the response options and number 
of items remained consistent with the SASC-R.  The 18-item SAS-A is scored on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (all the time), with higher scores indicating greater social 
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anxiety.  Four filler items are also included but do not contribute to the scoring (e.g., “I like to 
read”).  A three-factor structure was found for the SAS-A: 1) fear of negative evaluation, 2) 
distress to new situations, and 3) generalized social avoidance (Inderbitzen-Nolan & Walters, 
2000; La Greca & Lopez, 1998; Myers, Stein, & Aarons, 2002).  Additionally, a total score can 
be obtained by summing all items.  The SAS-A has been found to have adequate (>.70) to 
excellent (>.90) internal reliability of the subscales among adolescents in grades 6-12 
(Inderbitzen-Nolan & Walters, 2000; La Greca & Lopez, 1998; Myers et al., 2002).  Likewise, 
several studies have found convergence of the SAS-A and SASC-R with measures of anxiety, 
depression, peer acceptance, perceived social competence, friendships, self-esteem, and/or 
negative affectivity (Ginsburg, La Greca, & Silverman, 1998; Inderbitzen-Nolan & Walters, 
2000; La Greca & Lopez, 1998; La Greca & Stone, 1993; Myers et al., 2002).  In the current 
sample, the SAS-A demonstrated internal consistency of .93.  
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Child Version (OCI-CV). The OCI-CV (Foa et al., 
2010) is a 21-item self-report measure of obsessions and compulsions among children and 
adolescents.  The OCI-CV is a downward extension of the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory for 
adults (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998).  Items are rated on a 3-point Likert-type 
scale from 0 (never) to 3 (always), with higher scores indicating greater frequency of obsessions 
and compulsions.  The measure yields a total score (sum of all items) as well as six subscale 
scores indicating OCD symptom subtypes: 1) washing, 2) hoarding, 3) doubting/checking, 4) 
ordering, 5) obsessing, and 6) neutralizing.  Good (>.80) internal consistency of the total scale 
and each subscale has been noted in samples of children and adolescents ranging in age from 7 to 
18 years (Foa et al., 2010; Whiting, May et al., 2014).  The OCI-CV has demonstrated strong 
test-retest reliability correlations and has shown good convergence with parent, child, and 
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clinician administered measures of OCD and other anxiety constructs (Foa et al., 2010; Whiting, 
May et al., 2014).  In the current sample, the OCI-CV total score demonstrated an internal 
consistency of .89.  
Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children (PSQW-C).  The 14-item PSWQ-C 
(Chorpita, Tracey, Brown, Collica, & Barlow, 1997) is a self-report questionnaire of general 
worries for children and adolescents, based upon the Penn State Worry Questionnaire for adults 
(Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).  Items are rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale 
between 0 (not at all true) and 3 (always true), with higher scores indicating greater worry.  
Some items are reverse scored.  The PSWQ-C has demonstrated a unifactoral structure (Chorpita 
et al., 1997; Muris, Meesters, & Gobel, 2001).  Previous studies with children and adolescents 
between 6 and 18 years have found acceptable (>.75) to excellent (≥.90) internal consistency 
(Chorpita et al., 1997; Laugesen et al., 2003; Muris, Meesters et al., 2001; Muris, Meesters, 
Merckelbach, & Hülsenbeck, 2000).  The PSWQ-C has excellent test-retest reliability and has 
demonstrated adequate convergent and divergent validity (Chorpita et al., 1997; Muris, Meesters 
et al., 2001).  The PSWQ-C demonstrated internal consistency of .95 in the current sample. 
Children’s Depression Inventory 2: Self-Report-Short Form (CDI 2-S).  The CDI 2-S 
(Kovacs, 2010) is a brief version of the norm-referenced Children’s Depression Inventory 2 
(CDI 2; Kovacs, 2010), which was revised from the original CDI (Kovacs, 1992).  The revised 
version includes updated normative scoring for children and adolescents between 7 and 17 years 
and also contains new and revised items that capture core features of depression in youth.  The 
CDI 2-S contains 12-items rated on a 3-point scale; items are structured as three statements, 
which very in either intensity or frequency of a symptom (e.g., “I am sad once in a while [0]”, “I 
am sad many times [1]”, and “I am sad all the time [2]”).  Children and adolescents are asked to 
 !45!
read the statements for each item and choose the one that best fits their mood experience over the 
previous two weeks.  The CDI 2 and CDI 2-S have demonstrated good (>.80) internal 
consistency for the total scores (Kovaks, 2010).  Likewise, the CDI 2 has adequate convergent 
and discriminant validity (Kovaks, 2010).  The CDI 2-S has also shown strong convergence with 
the total score of the long form (Kovaks, 2010).  Internal consistency of the CDI 2-S in the 
current sample was .74.  
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3. ANALYTIC PLAN 
3.1 Missing Values Procedure  
Missing values were replaced by the within-subject means of completed items on the 
same subscale or from the total instrument for measures without subscales.  Missing values were 
only replaced if fewer than 10% of items from the instrument were missing, though this method 
is effective with up to 20% missingness (Downey & King, 1998).  Participants missing more 
than 10% of items on any one instrument were excluded from analyses that involved the 
incomplete measure(s).  One or more missing data points from eleven participants were replaced 
by the above procedure.  Nine participants had >10% missing on an individual subscale or 
measure, and those participants were excluded from analyses that utilized those missing 
variables. 
 
3.2 Preliminary Analyses 
Sample demographic influences were examined using multivariate analysis of variance.  
The examined sample characteristics were gender and race.  Females reported higher means on 
the BIS subscale (η2 = .12), PANAS-C-NA (η2 = .09), CASI (η2 = .01), PSWQ-C (η2 = .13), and 
SAS-A (η2 = .01; all p’s < .05).  In terms of race, those who self-reported as Asian endorsed 
higher scores on the OCI-CV (p < .05; η2 = .07) as compared to those who identified as 
White/Caucasian or Black/African American.  However, it should be noted that the sample size 
for those identifying as Asian was prohibitively small to draw conclusions (n=2).  No other 
significant racial discrepancies were found.  Given the small effect sizes of these demographic 
differences and inadequate power if the sample were to be split, all subsequent analyses are 
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performed using the total sample, with potential gender differences noted as a limitation of this 
investigation. 
Tests for outliers, linearity, and normality of the data were performed to ensure 
assumptions were met.  Participant z-scores were examined for each measure, with a cut-off of 
+/- 3 used to define a substantial outlier.  One participant was identified as an outlier on the 
IUSC and PANAS-C-NA and was therefore removed from analyses.  A separate participant had 
a z-score of 3.11 on the CDI 2-S but was not an outlier on other measures; this participant was 
not removed, as the z-score was close in range to other participants who were just under the 
threshold.  Mahalanobis Distances were used to test for multivariate outliers; no additional 
outliers were identified using this method.  Therefore, the total sample used for analyses was 
n=104.  Normality was partly defined as absolute skewness <2 and absolute kurtosis <7 (West, 
Finch, & Curran, 1998), which no instrument violated.  However, using the Shapiro-Wilk test, 
several scores were identifies as significantly non-normal.  Therefore, all subsequent analyses 
were conducted using bootstrapping with 1000 samples, which is an adequate minimum number 
of samples for generating accurate confidence intervals (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993).  
Bootstrapping is a resampling procedure that guards against violations of normality. 
 
3.3 Correlational Considerations for Model Revisions 
 All variables of interest were examined for correlations to demonstrate initial evidence 
supporting or disconfirming the hypothesized paths in the model.  These results were considered 
for alterations of the model in consort with the literature review above.  Correlational results 
supported the majority of hypothesized pathways, with the exception of paths between BAS and 
 !48!
social anxiety (SAS-S) and depression symptoms (CDI 2-S), and thought suppression (TCQ-A) 
and depression symptoms (see Table 1); therefore, those paths were removed.   
Some additional correlations were also observed, such as positive relationships between 
BAS and thought suppression (TCQ-A), anxiety sensitivity (CASI) and worry (PSWQ-C), and 
thought suppression (TCQ-A) and social anxiety symptoms (SAS-A).  As noted previously, a 
review of the literature does not offer strong support to add these pathways to the hypothesized 
model, despite the correlations found herein.  Therefore no additional pathways were included.  
 
3.4 Path Analysis Procedure 
 The final path model, the fully identified model, and the direct replication model were 
examined with regression-based modeling (Kline, 1998).  Each endogenous variable (i.e., those 
that are indicated by another variable) was set as a dependent variable in separate regression 
equations.  Standardized regression coefficients (i.e., beta weights) are equivalent to standardized 
path coefficients in this procedure. 
As demonstrated in the preliminary correlational analyses, all symptom measures in the 
model hold some degree of interrelation.  To improve independent estimation, symptom 
variables not of interest to a pathway are entered in the first block, followed by a second block 
containing the hypothesized predictor variables.  For example, in the regression model predicting 
generalized anxiety symptoms (PSWQ-C), the SAS-A, OCI-CV, and CDI 2-S are entered first in 
block 1 to control for shared symptom variance.  Then, the hypothesized constructs are entered 
into block 2 (PANAS-C-NA, BIS, IUSC, and TCQ-A). 
 !49!
Table 1. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations 
 M 
(SD) 
BIS BAS CASI CDI 2-S IUSC OCI-CV PANAS-C-
NA 
PANAS-C-
PA 
PSWQ-C SAS-A 
BIS 9.25 
(3.25) 
-          
BAS 24.55 
(6.99) 
.57** -         
CASI 30.30 
(6.63) 
.36** .133 -        
CDI 2-S 55.18 
(9.64) 
.35** -.16 .36** -       
IUSC 57.09 
(16.89) 
.56** .01 .58** .44** -      
OCI-CV 12.47 
(7.22) 
.45** -.00 .52** .41** .64** -     
PANAS-C-NA 29.31 
(9.42) 
.42** .14 .54** .58** .53** .55** -    
PANAS-C-PA 38.30 
(8.88) 
-.18 .34*
* 
-.21* -.45** -.26* -.25* -.31** -   
PSWQ-C 17.11 
(9.76) 
.65** .06 .56** .45** .67** .59** .67** -.23* -  
SAS-A Total 46.48 
(14.67) 
.67** -.04 .58** .47** .56** .46** .54** -.28* .54** - 
TCQ-A Total 15.64 
(4.69) 
.35** .29*
* 
.36** .06 .36** .31** .37** .13 .34** .36** 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale; BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale; CASI = Children’s Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index; CDI 2-S = Children’s Depression Inventory-2 Short Form; IUSC = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children; 
PANAS-C = Positive and Negative Affectivity Scales; OCI-CV = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Child Version; PSWQ-C = Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire for Children; SAS-A = Social Anxiety Scale-Adolescent Version; TCQ-A = Adolescent Thought Control 
Questionnaire. 
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3.5 Model Comparison Procedures 
 
To test hypothesis #7, a fully identified model is presented for comparison.  A fully 
identified model is one in which paths are drawn from every predictor variable to every measure 
of symptomatology, regardless of theory.  This contrast procedure is examines the parsimony of 
the hypothesized model and also further explores the non-hypothesized significant correlations 
noted in section 3.3.   
The hypothesized and fully identified models are contrasted by an examination of the 
variance accounted for by each.  This is accomplished by comparing the generalized squared 
multiple correlation of each model (R2M; see Kline, 1998).  The R2M for each is calculated by the 
following formula, where q is the number of regression equations in the model: 
R2M =1–(1–R21)(1–R22)...(1–R2q) 
Once the R2M is calculated for each model, the following formula contrasts the explanatory 
power of each, where Q represents the difference in variance explained, ranging from zero to 
one, with larger values indicating better fit of the hypothesized model: 
 Q =    1-R2full     _ 
           1- R2hypothesized 
Next, a significance test is performed by converting Q to a χ2 statistic with the degrees of 
freedom being the number of paths omitted from the hypothesized model as compared to the full 
model.  The following formula is used to achieve this conversion, where N is the sample size: 
 χ2Q = -(N – df) logeQ 
 Lastly, to address hypothesis #8, the direct replication model is calculated using the 
regression-based modeling procedures discussed in section 3.4.  To form the direct replication 
model, paths originally drawn in by Norton and Mehta (2007) are replicated and additional 
variables, such as BIS/BAS and thought suppression are removed.  
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Hypothesized Model Results 
As expected, temperament traits (negative affectivity and behavioral inhibition) 
significantly and positively contributed to anxiety sensitivity (39% variance explained), 
intolerance of uncertainty (39% variance explained), and thought suppression (17% variance 
explained).  Table 2 presents regressions on cognitive vulnerabilities and Figure 4 displays the 
revised hypothesized path model with standardized path coefficients (i.e., beta weights). 
Results were less consistent with hypotheses when examining regressions on symptom 
level variables (see Table 3).  Social anxiety symptoms were only predicted by behavioral 
inhibition (56% variance).  Likewise, only intolerance of uncertainty contributed significantly to 
OCD symptoms (49% variance).  Negative affectivity, behavioral inhibition, and intolerance of 
uncertainty were significantly related to worry (GAD symptoms) with 65% explained variance.  
Finally, depression symptoms were significantly explained (45%) by negative affectivity and 
lack of positive affectivity only.  
 
Table 2. Regressions Predicting Cognitive Vulnerabilities of Hypothesized Path Model 
  Regression Coefficients    
Criterion Predictors Unstandardized 
(std. err.) 
Standardized 
(beta) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
R2 f2 
1. CASI PANAS-C-NA .23** (.08) .32 .08 – .38 .39 .65 
 BIS .83** (.20) .40 .47 – 1.26   
        
2. IUSC PANAS-C-NA .52** (.18) .29 .16 – .88 .39 .59 
 BIS 2.21** (.48) .42 1.28 – 3.20   
        
3. TCQ-A PANAS-C-NA .12* (.06) .25 -.00 – .23 .17 .20 
 BIS .33* (.14) .23 .04 – .59   
Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01, f2 = Cohen’s f2 effect size; all values obtained using 1000 
bootstrapped samples 
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Figure 4. Hypothesized Model.  Notes: * p< .05, ** p<.01. Solid lines denote positive coefficients; dashed lines denote negative 
coefficients. 
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Table 3. Regressions Predicting Internalizing Domains of Hypothesized Path Model 
  Regression Coefficients    
 
Criterion 
 
Predictors 
Unstandardized 
(std. err.) 
 
Standardized  
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
R2 
 
f2 
1. SAS-A PANAS-C-NA .14 (.18) .09 -.21 – .48 .56 1.27 
 BIS 1.89** (.43) .42 .99 – 1.74   
 PANAS-C-PA -.09 (.13) -.06 -.35 – .17   
 CASI .42 (.23) .19 -.01 – .90   
 IUSC .12 (.09) .14 -.05 – .32   
        
2. OCI-CV PANAS-C-NA .11 (.11) .14 -.12 – .32 .49 .96 
 BIS -.10 (.24) -.04 -.57 – .36   
 CASI .13 (.13) .13 -.13 – .36   
 IUSC .15** (.05) .36 .06 – .24   
 TCQ-A .07 (.13) .05 -.19 – .30    
        
3. PSWQ-C PANAS-C-NA .34** (.10) .33 .14 – .52 .65 1.86 
 BIS .94** (.30) .31 .34 – 1.44   
 IUSC .16** (.06) .28 .05 – .28    
 TCQ-A -.02 (.15) -.01 -.35 – .23   
        
4. CDI 2-S PANAS-C-NA .38* (.16) .34 .07 – .71  .45 .82 
 BIS -.19 (.38) -.06 -.95 – .55   
 PANAS-C-PA -.29* (.12) -.27 -.51 – .05   
 IUSC .02 (.07) .03 -.11 – .16   
Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01, f2 = Cohen’s f2 effect size; presented results are from block 2, after 
controlling for shared symptom variance in the first block; all values were obtained using 1000 
bootstrapped samples. 
 
 
4.2 Fully Identified Model Results 
 To demonstrate parsimony of the hypothesized model, a fully identified model was 
evaluated in which all possible pathways were included in analyses (see Figure 5).  Fully 
identified pathways indicating cognitive vulnerabilities are displayed in Table 4 below.  Overall, 
results of the fully identified model were highly similar to the hypothesized model; negative 
affectivity and behavioral inhibition contributed 40% of the variance in anxiety sensitivity and 
intolerance of uncertainty scores separately.  While not hypothesized initially, positive 
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Figure 5. Fully Identified Model. Notes: grey paths are those omitted from the hypothesized model. Path coefficients omitted for ease 
of reading; see tables 4 and 5 for standardized path coefficients.   
Negative 
Affectivity 
(PANAS-C-NA) 
GAD 
(PSWQ-C) 
OCD 
(OCI-CV) 
Social Phobia 
(SAS-A) 
Depression 
(CDI-Short) 
Intolerance of 
Uncertainty 
(IUSC) 
Though 
Suppression 
(TCQ-A) 
Anxiety 
Sensitivity 
(CASI) 
Positive 
Affectivity 
(PANAS-C-PA) 
Behavioral 
Inhibition  
(BIS) 
 !55!
affectivity added additional variance to thought suppression scores, along with negative 
affectivity and behavioral inhibition (24% variance explained).   
No additional pathways indicating symptom types were significant beyond those found in 
the hypothesized model above.  As before, only behavioral inhibition contributed positively and 
significantly to social anxiety scores (57% variance explained).  Only intolerance of uncertainty 
explained significant variance in OCD symptoms (49%).  Negative affectivity, behavioral 
inhibition, and intolerance of uncertainty remained the only significant contributors to variance 
in worry scores (65%).  Finally, when fully identified, only negative affectivity explained 
variance in depression scores (47%); lack of positive affectivity did not remain significant.  Fully 
identified pathways indicating symptom domains are displayed below in Table 5. 
 
Table 4. Regressions Predicting Cognitive Vulnerabilities of Fully Identified Path Model 
  Regression Coefficients    
Criterion Predictors Unstandardized 
(std. err.) 
Standardized 
(beta) 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
R2 f2 
1. CASI PANAS-C-NA .22** (.07) .31 .08 – .36 .40 .67 
 BIS .83** (.20) .40 .44 – 1.22   
 PANAS-C-PA -.04 (.07) -.06 -.19 – .09   
        
2. IUSC PANAS-C-NA .47** (.18) .26 .09 – .80 .40 .67 
 BIS 2.18** (.50) .42 1.26 – 3.15   
 PANAS-C-PA -.22 (.16) -.12 -.52 – .07   
        
3. TCQ-A PANAS-C-NA .15** (.06) .31 .04 – .26 .24 .32 
 BIS .35* (.13) .25 .06 – .57   
 PANAS-C-PA .14** (.05) .27 .05 – .24   
        
Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01, f2= Cohen’s effect size; all values obtained using 1000 bootstrapped 
samples. 
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Table 5. Regressions Predicting Internalizing Domains of Fully Identified Path Model 
  Regression Coefficients    
 
Criterion 
 
Predictors 
Unstandardized 
(std. err.) 
 
Standardized  
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
R2 
 
f2 
1. SAS-A PANAS-C-NA .08 (.18) .05 -.25 – .42 .57 1.33 
 BIS 1.82** (.48) .40 .85 – 2.77   
 PANAS-C-PA -.14 (.14) -.09 -.43 – .12   
 CASI .39 (.22) .18 -.03 – .84   
 IUSC .10 (.10) .12 -.09 – .30   
 TCQ-A .40 (.25) .12 -.14 – .84   
        
2. OCI-CV PANAS-C-NA .10 (.11) .14 -.08 – .28 .49 .96 
 BIS -.09 (.26) -.04 -.61 – .43   
 PANAS-C-PA -.02 (.07) -.04 -.17 – .11   
 CASI .13 (.13) .12 -.10 – .36   
 IUSC .15** (.05) .35 .05 – .24   
 TCQ-A .09 (.13) .06 -.20 – .37    
        
3. PSWQ-C PANAS-C-NA .33** (.10) .33 .14 – .52 .65 1.86 
 BIS .92** (.30) .30 .26 – 1.45   
 PANAS-C-PA .02 (.08) .02 -.14 – .17    
 CASI .06 (.16) .04 -.22 – .41   
 IUSC .16** (.06) .27 .03 – .28    
 TCQ-A -.04 (.15) -.02 -.35 – .23   
        
4. CDI 2-S PANAS-C-NA .42* (.15) .42 .11 – .72  .47 .89 
 BIS -.14 (.40) -.05 -.97 – .63   
 PANAS-C-PA -.23 (.12) -.22 -.45 – -.01   
 CASI .04 (.16) -.03 -.35 – .26   
 IUSC .03 (.07) .06 -.10 – .18    
 TCQ-A -.35 (.18) -.17 -.75 – -.02   
Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01, f2 = Cohen’s f2 effect size; presented results are from block 2, after 
controlling for shared symptom variance in the first block; all values were obtained using 1000 
bootstrapped samples. 
 
4.3 Comparison of Variance Explained 
 The total variance explained by the hypothesized model (R2hyp = .99 was compared to 
that explained by the fully identified model (R2full = .99) via chi-square analysis as described in 
section 3.5 above.  The chi-square was significant, χ2 (9) = 17.21, p < .05, indicating the fully 
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identified model explained greater variance overall.  The observed difference in variance 
explained was 0.22%. 
 
4.4 Replication Model Results 
To replicate prior work with adult samples, a third model was evaluated that most closely 
resembles the work of Norton and Mehta (2007).  Regression values are presented in Table 6 and 
standardized path coefficients for this replication model are presented in Figure 6.  Negative 
 
Table 6. Regressions Predicting Replication Path Model 
  Regression Coefficients    
 
Criterion 
 
Predictors 
Unstandardized 
(std. err.) 
Standardized 
(beta) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
R2 
 
f2 
1. CASI PANAS-C-NA .37** (.06) .52 .24 – .50 .27 .37 
        
2. IUSC PANAS-C-NA .83** (.17) .46 .50 – 1.15 .27 .37 
 PANAS-C-PA -.25 (.18) -.13 -.59 – .10   
        
3. SAS-A PANAS-C-NA .19 (.19) .12 -.19 – .58 .48 .92 
 PANAS-C-PA -.07 (.14) -.05 -.35 – .20   
 CASI .64* (.25) .29 .14 – 1.10   
 IUSC .17 (.11) .20 -.05 – .39   
        
4. OCI-CV PANAS-C-NA .12 (.11) .15 -.10 – .32 .49 .96 
 CASI .13 (.12) .12 -.11 – .36   
 IUSC .15* (.05) .36 .06 – .25   
        
5. PSWQ-C PANAS-C-NA .39** (.08) .38 .24 – . 56 .60 1.50 
 PANAS-C-PA .04 (.07) .03 -.10 – .17   
 IUSC .20** (.06) .34 .08 – .32   
        
6. CDI 2-S PANAS-C-NA .38** (.15) .37 .09 – .68 .45 .82 
 PANAS-C-PA -.29** (.11) -.27 -.51 – -.07   
 IUSC .01 (.07) .02 -.12 – .15   
Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01, f2 = Cohen’s f2 effect size; all values obtained using 1000 
bootstrapped samples; regressions 3-6 results are from block 2, after controlling for shared 
symptom variance in the first block.
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Figure 6. Replication Model.  Notes:  Adapted from Norton and colleagues (2007).* p< .05, ** p<.01.  Solid lines denote positive 
coefficients; dashed lines denote negative coefficients. 
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affectivity significantly contributed to cognitive vulnerabilities of anxiety sensitivity (27% 
variance explained) and intolerance of uncertainty (27% variance explained).  Lack of positive 
affectivity did not significantly contribute to intolerance of uncertainty.   
Symptom domain pathways were also only partially supported.  Variance in social 
anxiety symptoms was significantly explained by anxiety sensitivity only (48%).  Intolerance of 
uncertainty was the only significant predictor of OCD symptomatology (49% variance 
explained).  Negative affectivity and intolerance of uncertainty predicted worry, though lack of 
positive affectivity was not significant (60% variance explained).  Finally, variance in depression 
symptoms as significantly explained by negative affectivity and lack of positive affectivity 
(45%); intolerance of uncertainty did not significantly contribute to depression ratings. 
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5. DISCUSSION  
 
 Developmental psychopathology theory and prior modeling research with adult samples 
presents a tiered vulnerability heuristic for the development of internalizing symptoms, with trait 
affective and/or biological vulnerabilities at the top, leading to more specific cognitive 
vulnerabilities that differentially contribute to symptomatology.  In the current study, such a 
heuristic was applied and tested in an adolescent sample, which has historically been an 
understudied developmental period, particularly in relation to cognitive aspects of 
psychopathology.  Three models were tested, a hypothesized path model, a fully identified model 
of comparison, and a model that more directly replicates prior research with adults. 
 
5.1 Negative Affectivity and BIS Hypothesized Pathways 
 Negative affectivity and BIS have a long history of research suggesting they are 
temperament or trait biological vulnerabilities for internalizing problems.  Current findings 
partially support this view. The hypothesized path model supports that trait negative affect and 
behavioral inhibition may be higher-order vulnerabilities for the development of all three 
cognitive variables: anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty, and thought suppression.  
Interestingly, BIS was more strongly related to the cognitive vulnerabilities than trait negative 
affect, though both explained significant variance.  This is an important - albeit theoretically 
consistent - finding that has previously been absent in large-scale vulnerability path models.  
Cognitive-Behavioral Theory suggests behavioral avoidance contributes to increased anxious or 
depressive cognitions due to limited opportunities for habituation learning to occur (Foa & 
Kozak, 1986).  Results are consistent with this view in that both trait avoidance behavior and 
propensity for negative affect contributed to trait maladaptive cognitions. 
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 While results clearly demonstrate the contribution of biological vulnerabilities to 
cognitive ones, results were more mixed for the direct contribution to symptomatology.  By 
definition, social anxiety, obsessions and compulsions, worries, and dysthymic mood involve the 
persistent or problematic experience of negative affect.  Therefore, both trait affect and cognitive 
variables were expected to contribute directly to internalizing symptoms.  This hypothesis was 
supported for symptoms of GAD and depression, but was not supported for social anxiety or 
OCD symptoms.  However, again supporting the importance of trait behavioral 
avoidance/inhibition, BIS was the only significant contributor to social anxiety symptoms.  The 
lack of direct higher-order biological vulnerabilities contributing to OCD symptoms suggests 
differentiation in the experience of those symptoms as compared to the others studied in this 
model.  Potentially, cognitive vulnerabilities are a greater component of OCD in youth as 
compared to affect or inhibition, as evidenced by the sole significant contribution of intolerance 
of uncertainty.  The doubting/checking subtype of OCD shows stronger relations with 
intolerance of uncertainty in adults compared to the other subtypes (Tolin et al., 2003).  Within 
this sample, post-hoc examination of the individual subscales on the OCI-CV indicated the 
doubting/checking subtype was more prevalent than other subtypes (doubting/checking mean = 
3.31; obsessions mean = 2.79; hoarding mean = 1.66; washing mean = 1.30; ordering mean = 
2.85; neutralizing mean = 0.69).  Therefore, it could be that intolerance of uncertainty is a 
stronger predictor of total OCD symptoms due to predominance of doubting/checking symptoms 
in this sample.  It could also be that instead of merely inhibiting behavior, those with OCD 
symptoms engage in active, compulsive behaviors to manage obsessions.   
A final alternative may be that OCD symptoms in this non-clinical sample, did not meet 
an adequate threshold for the other expected relationships to emerge.  However, this does not 
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seem likely given that age of onset for OCD is bimodal with an increase in late childhood 
(around age 11; e.g., “early onset”) and again in early adulthood (around age 23; e.g., “late 
onset”; Delorme et al., 2005), meaning typical ages for onset are within or near the range of the 
current sample.  Further, OCD symptoms have a dimensional quality, as opposed to taxonic 
(Haslam, Williams, Kyrios, & McKay, 2005; Olatunji, Williams, Haslam, Abramowitz, & Tolin, 
2008), which would suggest adequacy to capture relationships, despite a non-clinical sample.  
Indeed, models among adult community and clinical samples had similar null or weak 
relationships with trait affectivity, though trait behavior was not assessed in those studies 
(Norton et al., 2005; Norton & Mehta, 2007).  
 Interestingly, negative affectivity contributed as expected to depression symptoms, but 
BIS did not.  This is contrary to common behavioral experiences of depression such as 
withdrawal from social and leisure activities.  It is possible that depression in adolescents may 
manifest as having a greater emotional component than avoidant behavior.  However, the success 
of behavioral activation therapy for depression in adults does not lend support for this conclusion 
(for review, see Cuijpers, van Straten, & Warmerdam, 2007).  Though, it remains possible 
behavioral activation for adolescents does not function similarly, as large-scale randomized 
clinical trials of pure behavioral activation (i.e., in the absence of other cognitive treatment 
elements) are absent in the literature.  Instead, a structural equation modeling study found that 
the best fitting pathway between BIS and depression symptoms in youth is one in which BIS is a 
vulnerability for anxiety first, which then leads to depression symptoms (Muris, Mercklebach, 
Schmidt, Gadet, & Bogie, 2001). 
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5.2 Positive Affectivity and BAS Hypothesized Pathways 
Initial correlational findings did not support the hypothesized contribution of behavioral 
activation to social anxiety and depression symptoms.  Those unsupported hypotheses were 
therefore removed.  Findings from the extant literature have been quite variable regarding the 
relationship between low behavioral activation and depression or social anxiety and the current 
findings suggest other factors, chiefly trait affectivity, are more important to these internalizing 
domains in youth.   
Positive affectivity largely performed as expected, however.  The combination of 
elevated negative affectivity and reduced positive affectivity significantly contributed to 
depression symptoms, as expected according to the Tripartite Model (Clark & Watson, 1991).  
Thus, along with negative affectivity, the lack of positive affectivity appears to uniquely 
differentiate depression from other internalizing syndromes.   
While there is some evidence in the literature that low positive affectivity is also 
associated with social anxiety, such a relationship did not emerge in the current study.  This null 
relationship is similar to findings by Treadwell and Kendall (1996) in which frequency of 
negative, but not positive, self-statements predicted children’s anxiety symptoms and also 
mediated cognitive-behavioral treatment gains.  A possible explanation is that one’s level of 
positive affectivity is not a vulnerability for social anxiety in young people, but is a result of 
avoidance behaviors.  Kashdan and Stager (2006) partially explain this hypothesis in an 
experience-sampling (e.g., ecological momentary sampling) study.  Socially anxious individuals 
reported greater positive affect on days when their social anxiety was lowest, and the opposite 
trend for high-anxiety days.  Likewise, the authors found low endorsement of positive daily 
events on high-anxiety days, suggesting that anxiety may lead to behavioral avoidance, thus 
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limiting opportunities for positive affect or experiences.  In adolescents, the ability to avoid 
potentially positive daily experiences are reduced due to compulsory education.  While still 
anxious, adolescents may have greater opportunities for everyday pleasurable events (e.g., 
classes, reading, physical education/activity, etc.), which could have influenced the null pathway 
in the current study.  
 
5.3 Anxiety Sensitivity Hypothesized Pathways 
Pathways between anxiety sensitivity and OCD and social anxiety symptoms were not 
supported by the current data.  These null findings could be due to the multidimensionality of the 
anxiety sensitivity construct.  The factor structure of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss et al., 
1986) and its various revisions for adult respondents have most often demonstrated a hierarchical 
factors structure with a single broad construct followed by three or four subfactors relating to 
physical, cognitive, and social consequences of anxiety sensations (Deacon, Abramowitz, 
Woods, & Tolin, 2003; Rodriguez, Bruce, Pagano, Spencer, & Keller, 2004; Zinbarg, Barlow, & 
Brown, 1997).  The total score does not differentiate the various anxiety constructs as well as the 
individual sub-factors (Deacon & Abramowitz, 2006).  Specifically, the anxiety sensitivity social 
concerns dimension is strongly associated, unsurprisingly, with social phobia (Deacon & 
Abramowitz, 2001; McWilliams, Stewart, & MacPherson, 2000; Zinbarg et al., 1997) as well as 
socially observable OCD compulsions (e.g., checking, ordering/arranging); Raines, Oglesby, 
Capron, & Schmidt, 2014).  Those with OCD demonstrate greater physical anxiety sensitivity 
concerns compared to those with other anxiety disorders, excepting panic disorder (Deacon & 
Abramowitz, 2001).  Anxiety sensitivity cognitive concerns (i.e., concern that anxiety sensations 
indicate loss of mental faculty) is also associated with aggressive, religious, or sexual obsessions 
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and some neutralizing compulsions (Raines et al., 2014).  The cognitive concerns dimension is 
also commonly associated with chronic worry specifically (Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, & 
Leybman, 2007). 
The CASI (Silverman et al., 1991) has inconsistently demonstrated a similar structure to 
its adult counterpart in which there is a higher-order single factor (i.e., total score) and either 
three or four specific subfactors similar in nature to physiological, cognitive, and social concerns 
(Muris et al., 2001).  Therefore, the null findings of the current investigation’s hypothesized 
model may be due to lack of specificity both in the anxiety sensitivity total score as well as 
specific domains of obsessions and compulsions.  That is, a total score may obscure 
multidimensional relationships that have emerged in the adult literature.  However, the exact 
facture structure of the CASI (i.e., three versus four subfactors) remains in question and has not 
been consistently replicated, thus limiting the ability to address this question in the current study.   
 
5.4 Intolerance of Uncertainty Hypothesized Pathways 
 Two of the four hypothesized relationships between intolerance of uncertainty and 
internalizing psychopathology were supported.  Consistent with cognitive-theory and published 
adult and youth studies, intolerance of uncertainty was associated with OCD and GAD 
symptomatology.  This lends support to cognitive conceptualizations that suggest cognitive 
rigidity is a significant and overarching component of OCD and GAD symptom development 
and maintenance (Carleton, 2012; Dugas, Buher, & Ladouceur, 2004).  Likewise, these pathways 
support the applicability of these cognitive frameworks to youth.  Therefore, intolerance of 
uncertainty may warrant greater attention in therapeutic interventions for adolescents, as has 
been applied in treatment studies for adults.  Dugas and Ladouceur (2000) developed a 
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cognitive-behavioral treatment for adults with GAD that specifically targets intolerance of 
uncertainty.  Immediate and long-term outcomes (12 months) included significant reductions of 
intolerance of uncertainty itself and sustained remission of GAD.  Interventions that target these 
relevant higher-order cognitive vulnerabilities have the potential to improve treatment response 
for youth due to equivalent pathways in adult and youth hierarchical path models such as this. 
 However, two additional hypothesized intolerance of uncertainty pathways – those 
leading to social anxiety and depressive symptoms – were not significant.  Prior models, which 
served as the basis for the present investigation, found similar inconsistent relationships; 
intolerance of uncertainty was associated with depression in a clinical adult sample (Nortal et al., 
2005) but that relationship was weaker among a non-clinical adult sample (Norton et al., 2007).  
Therefore, replication with clinically depressed youth is recommended before conclusions are 
drawn regarding the influence of intolerance of uncertainty to depressive disorders in 
adolescents.   
 Surprisingly, intolerance of uncertainty did not significantly contribute to adolescents’ 
reports of social anxiety.  While a newer empirical line of research in comparison to studies of 
GAD and OCD, the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety in adults 
and emerging adults (undergraduates) appears rather robust (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton 
et al., 2010; Whiting et al., 2013).  However, like anxiety sensitivity, there is evidence to suggest 
that the Inhibitory Anxiety subfactor of intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty prevents 
taking action) largely drives this association with social anxiety (Carleton et al., 2010; Whiting et 
al., 2013).  These subfactor differences have only been published among studies using measures 
of intolerance of uncertainty for adults.  The IUSC (Comer et al., 2009), while adapted for youth, 
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has not undergone factor analysis and thus a breakdown of subfactor distinctions is premature for 
the current study but is a needed area of research.  
 
5.5 Thought Suppression Hypothesized Pathways 
The pathway between thought suppression and depression symptoms was removed for 
lack of correlational evidence in the current sample.  This pathway was hypothesized based on 
extant research among adult samples; however, this relationship has been noted inconsistently in 
prior studies and is typically not of a strong magnitude (Muris, Merckelbach, & de Jong, 1993; 
Roemer & Borkovec, 1994).  Therefore, it is a somewhat unsurprising null finding, though 
replication with clinically diagnosed youth is needed to make further determinations, due to an 
extremely limited body of research on this area in young people.  Similarly, there is evidence to 
suggest moderating effects of stress on the relationship between depression and though 
suppression.  Adults who engage in greater thought suppression and who have high levels of 
stress, demonstrate greater depression symptoms than do those with similarly high thought 
suppression engagement but low life stress (Beevers & Meyer, 2004).  This pattern is consistent 
with Barlow’s Triple Vulnerabilities Model (2002).  It could be that stress levels influenced the 
relationships tested here, though general stress was not measures to test this hypothesis.  
Another possible explanation for null findings is the influence of measurement in the 
current procedures. Thought suppression, as measured by the TCQ-A (Whiting et al., 2014) and 
the analogous measure for adults, assesses several methods with which individuals attempt to 
control or suppress unwanted thoughts.  Some methods are conceptualized as adaptive due to 
negative relationships with psychopathology (i.e., reappraisal and social), and others are either 
largely neutral (i.e., distraction), or maladaptive (i.e., punishment and worry; Wells & Carter, 
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2009; Wells & Davies, 1994; Whiting et al., 2014).  It is possible that the use of the total score to 
capture overall thought suppression engagement obscured distinct positive and negative 
relationships, leading to nonsignificant pathways.  The internal consistency of some individual 
subscales of the TCQ-A was prohibitively low for analyses beyond use of merely the total score, 
however.  Further measure refinement and additional study in clinical samples of youth with 
internalizing disorders is needed before such analyses should be undertaken. 
 
5.6 Discussion of Comparison to Fully Identified Model 
A comparison of the amount of variance explained by the hypothesized model versus the 
fully identified model was not expected to be significant, indicating parsimony and supporting 
theory-based relationships in the hypothesized model.  While tests resulted in a statistical 
difference in variance explained, the observed difference was considered not practically 
significant.  This indicates the presumed null paths in the hypothesized model do not 
meaningfully contribute to the cognitive vulnerabilities and internalizing symptom domains 
studied here.   
A notable exception was the pathway between positive affectivity and thought 
suppression, indicating that positive affectivity contributed to total thought suppression 
engagement.  This positive relationship runs against expectations.  For example, adults who use 
thought suppression for emotion regulation have increased negative affect and reduced positive 
affect, while those who engage in reappraisal of emotions show the opposite pattern (Gross & 
John, 2003).  This pattern partly forms the basis for cognitive therapy interventions such as 
Acceptance and Commitment Theory.  The reappraisal component, though, may explain the 
unexpected result seen herein.  Due to limited study overall, and lower internal reliability of the 
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individual subscales of the TCQ-A in the current sample, the total score was used to represent 
overall frequency of thought suppression.  However, it is likely that a specific relationship 
between positive affectivity and reappraisal or social thought control drove the unusual positive 
relationship noted in the fully identified model.    
 
5.7 Replication Model Discussion 
The hypothesized model was an extension of research conducted by Sexton et al. (2003) 
and Norton and colleagues (2005; 2007) in adult samples.  As such, the hypothesized model 
included additional vulnerability constructs (e.g., BIS, thought suppression) believed to also be 
related to internalizing disorders.  However, to more directly replicate prior research, a third 
model was examined that included only those constructs from published models (see Figure 6). 
A minor difference between the hypothesized model, which included a behavioral 
vulnerability, and the replication model, which excluded that variable, was that anxiety 
sensitivity significantly contributed to social anxiety symptoms in the replication model.  When 
trait propensity for behavioral avoidance is accounted for in the hypothesized model, this 
relationship disappears, however.  This suggests a direct relationship between behavioral 
avoidance and sensitivity to physiological arousal.  While modeled here as beginning with trait 
avoidant behavior, the cross-sectional nature of this design cannot exclude the possibility that the 
inverse relationship is true or that the relationship is bidirectional.   
Overall however, the replication model performed similarly to the structural model 
presented by Norton et al. (2007) in adults.  Direct comparison of pathway significance is 
difficult due to differing statistical methodologies (i.e., regression-based versus structural 
equation modeling).  Broadly though, the cognitive vulnerabilities of anxiety sensitivity and 
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intolerance of uncertainty were predicted by trait negative affectivity in both models, supporting 
the hierarchical conceptualization of developmental vulnerabilities.  The individual pathways 
leading to OCD, GAD, and depression symptoms varied slightly between studies but overall 
support hypotheses and vulnerabilities theory.  While the sample size herein precludes use of 
structural statistical modeling, the similarities between this and the adult model support such 
application in future research.  
 
5.8 Limitations and Future Directions 
 A strength of the current investigation is the conservative control employed for potential 
measurement overlap.  However, this level of control may have eliminated relevant overlapping 
aspects of internalizing symptomatology from study.  This work, with its tight control, provides 
groundwork for future investigations, which might utilize clinical populations to reduce the need 
for such rigid controls. 
 While attempts were made to sample from a broad community base, the current findings 
remain limited by sampling methodology.  First, participants were from the community and do 
not necessarily represent those with clinical diagnoses of an internalizing disorder.  Similarly, 
though distributed to males and females equally, is disproportionate number of females returned 
responses.  Female adolescents are known to show higher rates of internalizing psychopathology 
broadly compared to males (Lewinsohn et al., 1998), and thus the higher proportion of females 
somewhat limits generalizability to male youth.  Further, the sample size, while largely adequate 
for these preliminary model statistics, is prohibitively small to perform separate analyses by 
gender to address the gender imbalance limitation.  
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 Due to the exploratory nature of this study (i.e., application to a new population with 
limited study), regression-based path modeling statistics were used.  That is, regression based 
analyses allow for smaller sample size and thus, fewer required resources to conduct this study.  
However, this limits evaluation of overall model fit and direct comparison to the Norton et al. 
(2007) structural model.  However, now that preliminary study has been conducted, alterations to 
the model and measurement procedures can be employed in future research (e.g., latent variable 
constructs using multiple measures for each variable).  Likewise, this study serves as reasonable 
support for utilizing increased resources for study in clinical samples and overall larger samples 
to better speak to goodness of model fit.  
While theory suggests a developmental pathway starting with trait affect and behavior, 
leading to cognitive vulnerabilities and psychopathology, this cross-sectional design cannot 
evaluate temporal development of psychopathology (i.e., causation).  At this juncture, a 
prospective research design is premature.  However, the adequate replication of the adult path 
model, indicates that adult models of affective, behavioral, and cognitive components of 
internalizing disorders likely adequately represent the experience of internalizing 
psychopathology in adolescents.  This study therefore presents a foundation on which to refine 
the model and employ prospective methodology in the future.  
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